THE MUSLIM WORLD

VOL. XLVIII OCTOBER, 1958 NO. 4

بِلِقَاءِ رَبِّكُمْ تُوقِنُونَ

"MEETING WITH YOUR LORD"

"What? it will be questioned, when the sun rises, do you not see a round disc of fire something like a guinea? O no! I see an innumerable company of the heavenly host, crying: Holy, holy, holy is the Lord God Almighty." So William Blake. And there is, in his assurance of the realm of nature as the setting of the tokens of God, and also in his incredulous wonder at men's capacity to be obtusely unaware of them, something of the surprise and awe of certain Quranic phrases where the theme is God and man and nature. Perhaps the most notable of these is the phrase about "encountering your Lord."

The context very frequently leaves one no option but to interpret the meaning in relation to the post-resurrection confrontation with God as judge. Indeed in some nine or ten passages the word لقاء occurs in the phrase لِقَاءَ ٱلْيَوْمِ "the meeting with the day (of judgement)," and in six or seven other places where the word is found in conjunction with "the Lord" the context makes it entirely plain that judgement after death is the one sense of the encounter in question. But meeting with the Lord of life beyond the grave, which was so recurrent and urgent a theme in the Prophet's preaching, especially in the Meccan Surahs, undoubtedly rests upon the reality of His relationships with men within this mortal world. He before whom men will ultimately stand in the inescapable encounter with their destiny is the One with Whom they have to do in the here and now. Were it not so, there could be no force or point in the subsequent, eternal dimension of the human-Divine relationship. The very

urgency and awesomeness of the Quranic reckoning of God with men at judgement make equally urgent and awesome those other "meetings with their Lord" which belong to men's context in nature and their obligations to grace.

It is these which many commentators have overlooked and some translators have assumed referred necessarily to post-resurrection encounters, even where the context shows that there is a more immediate and an earthly relevance. In three passages in particular, namely Surahs x. 16, xxx. 8 and xli. 54, the setting has to do either with nature in all its variety and mystery, or with the fact of revelation and prophecy. Though three is perhaps a small proportion as against the other frequent connotations of the phrase, spiritual potential is not to be quantitatively determined. It is a very far-reaching truth that men are often unaware of the Divine reality with an unawareness that is reprehensible because it arises from complacence or arrogance or the sheer assertiveness of established delusions. How easily men may be diverted from the true significance of things, idolising them in despite of the God beyond and over them! "Did these things (the sun, the moon, my ample wealth) steal my heart away" said Job, "so that my mouth kissed my hand in adoration? That were a mighty wrong, to deny God Who is higher than all." (Job xxxi. 27-28.) Many fall where Job stood stedfast: and if the modern idols have to do more with technology than astronomy the mistake of missing, and thus dismissing, God in things remains no less pervasive a danger.

So in the final verses of Surah xli, the Surah of "things made plain," — disencumbered, that is, of obscurity and ambiguity, so that the decriers who refuse the evidences of nature and of prophecy are clearly in the wrong — comes the assurance that God locates His 'signs' "in all the realms of the earth and in the very souls of men." "Yet still they remain dubious that it is really Him with Whom they have to do." Nevertheless it is He Who encompasseth all things, the tokens of Whose majesty and grace are everywhere dis-

cernible to those with eyes to see. In Surah x. 16 "those who have no desire to have to do with Us" (not, as in Daud's translation, "those who deny the Last Judgement") are pictured as cavilling about the "clear revelations that are recited to them" and demanding another Qur'ān with a different text. The answer made to them appeals to the fact that Muḥammad spent a whole life-time among them before it was revealed. The suggestion seems to be that it was not a pre-meditated production but came at God's behest. But whatever the precise contextual point, it is certain that the unwillingness of men to face up to God is thought of as within this world, at the rendezvous that revelation sets and, on God's side, keeps. Similarly in Surah xxx. 8, many, it is said, do not realise God's righteous ways and reckon with Him. The lessons of history are lost upon them. They are incredulous about meeting God in eternity because they are negligent of His manifest activity in the here and now of faithful seasons, of a history shot through with moral laws, and of recurrent visitations of prophetic word. The sense of the passage is that the infinite is missed because the finite is misconstrued, when "men do not know assuredly that they are meeting with their Lord." (Surah xiii. 2)

It is useful to recollect how frequent and urgent this very same theme is, *mutatis mutandis,* in the Biblical realm. There also sin and complacence, self-will and obduracy, busyness and pre-occupation, are seen as involving men in a desperate unawareness of God, His sovereignty and His claims. And when we reach the Christian fulness in Christ, the New Testament is alive with the same truth of God incognito, of a Divine presence which goes all unrecognised because men are too proud, too habit-bound or too heedless to discover. The whole strange and wonderful story of men's understanding of Jesus as Lord can be summed up in the realisation that "they were meeting with God." For in Him, the loving initiative of God had undertaken communication with man in the human, personal terms in which alone such communication could adequately be undertaken so as to suffice

the Divine glory it brought and the human context it addressed.

The meaning of the Gospel is that in all the varied incidents the Gospels describe, whether in the moonlight on the Mount of Olives, under the noonday sun at Sychar's well, in the still night with Nicodemus, or amid the spring flowers of the Galilee mountain of the sermon, "men should realise that they are meeting with their Lord." For here is the encounter, loving and tremendous, which God Himself has willed and caused to be, that humanity may know His nature from within. The climax of that story is the Cross. Here more wonderfully than in any other place we have to do with the love that is Divine in its most characteristic heart. And thus the soul of the Christian faith, pondering on the Cross, is expressed by the apostle who writes: "We have known and believed the love that God hath to us." (1. John iv. 16.) If it was apostles who gave this discovery articulate expression, it was a dying brigand who first confessed it, with the only words, aside from taunts, addressed to the crucified Christ: "Lord remember me when Thou comest into Thy Kingdom." For where was the Kingdom discernible unless in the kingship of the sufferer? Nowhere else did the Cross offer any suggestion of a future. Only in the quality of Him Who suffered and what His grace achieved in one inclusive encounter with the sin of the world, do we recognise that here above all "we are meeting with our Lord—with the Lord of all."

Still, in the obscurity of men's inattention, in the hiddenness with which their incredulity shrouds it, the eternal sign abides, the Word made flesh, the Messiah made servant, the Cross made life. The whole business of those who understand is to serve its disclosure, in a world that so often misses its own point—the point, that is, where God in nature, truth and grace, makes rendezvous with men. "You are those" says a character in T.S. Eliot's *The Family Reunion* "for whom nothing has ever happened,"—of a family always busy with this and that. The significance of everything had never

become everything to them: they had never awakened to their own tragedy in that life had been a steady eluding of their Lord.

Men in such case, who have never found God, have by the same token effectively lost themselves. For it is surely in being "alive unto God"—if we may borrow that immense New Testament phrase with its confident clue to such aliveness "through Jesus Christ our Lord"—that men are fully and blessedly alive. Such recognition of God in the fulness of His mercy and truth is the very heart of life's meaning.

Does not this fact also lie, in the last analysis, within and behind all intelligible affirmation of the unity of God? "Whom have I in heaven but Thee?" is the cry, not primarily of the discoursive theologian intent on definition, but of the discovering soul intent on adoration. "There is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee" is the confession not of dogma only but rather of devotion. How often our Muslim-Christian debates about the Divine unity have stayed in the realm of the propositional and the verbal. "God in Christ" has been Islamically disqualified for reasons that have never penetrated the experience that makes the phrase valid. Do we not too often treat God as "Him of Whom we have to debate" rather than "Him with Whom we have to do"? Can we not shift the ground of our inter-relationship under God to one upon which we are ready for an encounter, not with each other's objections, but with Him.

For in the end the whole Muslim concept of Tauḥīd means, if it means anything, the tremendous reality of God the One. Or, as Martin Buber finely says of the experience of God in the Jewish soul, there is an encounter with God so satisfying, so moving, so valid, that all notion of plurality of gods becomes unthinkable. The soul's wondering "Thou art!" responds in joyous recognition to the Lord's "I AM." How tragic if, blind to this whole dimension of revelatory initiative and encounter we fall back into a complacent assertions of dogma that "He is." For there can well be a formal monotheism that does not know any "meeting with our Lord."

THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN IDEAS AND SOCIAL VALUES TO MUSLIM SOCIETY

[A Paper read at the International Islamic Colloquium, Lahore, on January 2nd, 1958, by Dr. Muḥammad Daud Rahbar.]

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

At the International Islamic Colloquium held in Lahore recently (see report by Dr. Bayard Dodge, in *The Muslim World*, Vol. xlviii. 3, July, 1958, pp. 192-204.) certain delegates asked the writer of the following paper to withdraw it. Towards the end of the Colloquium, however, some of those who so insisted reconsidered their position and changed the demand for withdrawal to one for amendment of the paper in respect of those features to which they took objection.

The Colloquium Committee strongly pressed the writer to reconsider his paper in the light of the criticism that had been made. THIS DELEGATE MADE AN AMENDMENT WITHIN FAIRNESS, ONE WHICH SEEKS A LITTLE AMPLIFICATION OF IDEAS IN ORDER TO OBVIATE MISUNDERSTANDING. THE AMENDMENT, HOWEVER, DOES NOT RECEDE FROM ANY BASIC IDEA ON THE ISSUES CONTROVERTED.

This delegate sent to the Colloquium office the amended paper on January 24th, and a note on the general nature of the amendments (also for the Proceedings) on February 20th. He is glad that the courtesy of *The Muslim World* affords him on opportunity to make available to the public the amended text of the Colloquium paper with notes indicating the changes made. The publication is meant to cope with a widespread curiosity on the matter and to ensure careful attention to the footnotes. In case the editors of the Volume of Proceedings of the Colloquium wish to annotate their ultimate publication attention is drawn to the fully detailed annotation here supplied. The abbreviation: O.P.F. stands for "the original printed form" in which the paper was read at the Colloquium. The abbreviation F.D. stands for "the first draft" which was originally sent to the Colloquium office some weeks prior to the meeting. This was found too long by them and was reduced at their request by the writer to nearly a half.

Note [1] on the amendments made later: It is felt by this delegate that much of the controversy, articulated around this paper in the proceedings of the Colloquium, was caused by brevity of statements in the paper. The time given to each speaker had to be limited and papers had to be short. The amendment, therefore, seeks amplification of ideas on points controverted at the Colloquium:

1. It was said by some that the bulk of the paper dealt with a new attitude to Tafsīr, and therefore sidetracked the title of the paper. A passage is added pointing out that understanding of the Qurʾān does, and should, enjoy centrality in Muslim thinking at all times,

[1] The note beginning here was sent for the Volume of Proceedings.

and adjustment in this understanding is the greatest question of our changing times.

2. This writer quoted the opinion of certain Mutakallimīn who said that فَاتَّقُوا اللّٰهَ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ abrogated فَاتَّقُوا اللّٰهَ حَقَّ تُقَاتِهِ Already it was said in the paper that "this seems a forced incorporation of the idea of Naskh into Kalām." But some delegates misunderstood that I held the same view at those Mutakallimīn. This misunderstanding is removed by further clarification. The reference to the passage of the *ʿItqān* of Al-Suyūṭī, where the opinion of those Mutakallimīn is cited, is also added.
3. When this writer quoted Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khan on Waḥy, it was misconcluded by some that this writer identified his view with that of Sir Sayyid. This was never the case. It is now added that this writer does not commit himself for nor against Sir Sayyid.
4. The paper had already said in the passage on the Prophet's pre-Waḥy knowledge of former prophets that that knowledge was "not identical with the knowledge that came later in revelatory language, with meanings more crystallised and words far more beautiful." For clarity of emphasis a passage is added to the effect that though the Qur'an brought a superior version of those qiṣaṣ, the Prophet as a fond associate of ḥanīfs, must at least have heard the names and some accounts of earlier prophets in whom those ḥanīfs believed, and that denying this much would be too extreme a position.

Within its rights, the Colloquium Committee only requested this delegate to reconsider the paper in the light of criticism made at the Colloquium, and these amendments are made as a gesture of respect for those who felt the need.

THE PAPER

I. Develop a taste for Dynamism [1] by developing historical Sense.
II. Fill the Void of Kalām.
III. Study Comparative Religions.

I. Nothing characterises our age more than rapidity of change [2]. What the contemporary Muslim society needs first is a taste for change [3]. To create that taste the most effective measure will be to develop abundant knowledge of the element of change and movement in the history of Islam, and to discover fully, and spread the conviction thereof, that Islam is dynamic. In order to evince a spirit of new adaptations and assimilations, nothing will help more than a realisation of the reality that we adapted and assimilated incessantly in our past of over thirteen centuries.

---

1 The O.P.F. had the word "Movement" instead of "Dynamism".
2 The O.P.F. had the word "movement" instead of "rapidity of change".
3 The O.P.F. had the word "movement" instead of "change".

The full significance of the historical sense of, and the historical attitude to, Islam, would be brought out, not in such a brief writing from the pen of one with limited knowledge, but after a century or so of an actual *movement* of such application of that attitude to the study of Islam.

The character of an age [1] is indexed best in the forms of philosophy peculiar to it. The finest philosophy of our century is, before anything else, data-minded, and therefore history-minded. Never before did philosophers have to be as efficient *historians of philosophy* as today. Semantics, the most typical expression of contemporary philosophy, approaches the contents of the human mind "histologically." Logical Positivism, the most typical school of philosophy of our age, would rather examine what metaphysicians in the past meant than "philosophise" metaphysically anew.

In the West, historical attitudes to Scriptures were necessitated by the rise of Empiricism and Objectivism. These attitudes came first as a shock, but they were inevitable. They set people to exert their minds, and by the very tools of objectivity which first seemed to uproot faith in the West, they discovered the dignity of the domain of the Subjective. In this connection the contribution of Kant is most outstanding.

Foremost among our needs today is a modern historical attitude to our Holy Book, which does and should enjoy centrality in the Islamic universe of thinking at all times.

HISTORICAL SENSE APPLIED TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE HOLY BOOK

The Qurʾān is the eternal Word of God. Its Nuzūl (Descent) began with Surah ʿAlaq, when the Prophet, peace be upon him, was forty years of age. Its Nuzīl continued from that first revelation till the very last days of the Prophet's life. Thus the Nuzūl was spread over some twenty-three years. The Mufassirīn of the Qurʾān have accepted, nay, thought indispensable, to refer to the Cause of Descent (Sabab al-Nuzūl) of each and every āyah in attempting to understand it fully. Statistics will show that the number of āyāt which simply must be referred to a historical Sabab al-Nuzūl for interpretation is a very big one. Abū Lahab and Zaid are mentioned in the Qurʾān by name. Who will deny that the Qurʾān has passages relating to the Battles of Badr and Uḥud; the conquest of Greece by the Persians; the Envoy of Najrān; the change of Qiblah from Bait al-Maqdas to the Kaʿbah; the arrogant Quraish; the hypocrisy of the opponents of Islam, then; the negotiations; the Jews at Medina; the Ascension; the Prophet's domestic affairs; situations of slander; the treaties, and so on?

In this connection it is most stimulating to note the title of Section 10 in Al-Suyūṭī's *ʿItqān*:

[1] This paragraph opening here and the two that follow, are added later. This addition ends with the words "..... at all times".

فيما نُزِّلَ من القرآن على لسان بعض الصحابة وهو في الحقيقة نوع من أسباب النزول

and under this title is mentioned, for example, the āyah of Ḥijāb which was revealed immediately after Hazrat ᶜUmar spoke to the Prophet about the need of Ḥijāb.

In a way even most of [1] the stories of earlier prophets and nations are narrated in the Qurᵓān in relationship with the situations around the Prophet. [The essence of what these stories signify is this: Beware! Earlier prophets were belied by their peoples. God destroyed those rebellious folk. If you do the same, your doom will be like] [2].

The Qurᵓān is a very major source of the history of the early years of Islam. This idea is not unfamiliar to Western scholarship. In fact Western scholarship seems somewhat excessively pre-occupied by this approach to the study of the Qurᵓān and treats the Qurᵓān more as an effect and seldom as a cause. An example of this over-doing is the rearrangement of the Qurānic text by the late Revd. Richard Bell. His principle of chronological rearrangement of verses *within* Surahs is unwarranted, since the Qurᵓān proceeds by free retrospect in a rhetorical style [3]. Muslim scholarship, however, has seldom used the Qurᵓān as one of the sources of any part of the Prophet's life-history, fearing perhaps that such attempts would imply a non-eternal or un-Divine nature of the Book, though the conclusion does not follow logically if the belief in Divine Omniscience is co-ordinated here. This hesitation, surprisingly enough, has existed alongside lengthy discussions of the Sabab al-Nuzūl of one and all āyāt, and alongside ample discourses about the Prophet's life in the comments on a great many āyāt in Tafsīrs. Maulana Abū-l-Kalām Azād, the contemporary Indian Mufassir, writes in his *Tadhkirah* (Calcutta, ed. 1919, pp. 180-188) that once he conceived of writing a biography of the Prophet entirely from the Qurᵓān as a source. But he hesitated and consulted his teacher Shibli Nuᶜmānī, who in his turn hesitated and said 'Yes' after considerable pondering. Abū-l-Kalām says that he did embark on this work with exciting results. *And yet he never ventured to publish the work.*

After all complete overlooking of Asbāb al-Nuzūl reduces the Qurᵓān to a book which might have been received by the Prophet as a bound volume all at once [4].

Both Shah Waliyullah of Delhi (d. 1762) (in his *Al-Fauz al-Kabīr fī-Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*), and Sir Sayyid Aḥmad Khān (d. 1898) (in his *Taḥrīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*), show consciousness of the importance of the relation of revelation to its historical context. There is hardly a

[1] The words "most of" are added later.
[2] The words within brackets are incorporated from the F.D.
[3] The sentence ending here is incorporated from the F.D., in a summarised form.
[4] The O.P.F. had the following paragraph instead of this: "Muslims of moderate education in our country at least, even today, understand the Nuzūl of the Qurᵓān in the sense of the Prophet's receiving the Qurᵓān from the literal physical above as a bound volume. This is no exaggeration."

need here to mention the famous *Asbāb al-Nuzūl* written by Al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505).

The lack of historical sense leaves us oblivious of the flexibilities within the Qur'ān, flexibilities arising from the differences in situations related to āyāt, and this arouses uncalled for doubts about consistency. Development is not inconsistency.

That the idea of the *development* of Muslim Law (not the Doctrine) with the piecemeal Nuzūl of the Qur'ān was acceptable to Classical Islam, is evidenced by the fact that the doctrine of Naskh (Abrogation) of some verses of the Qur'ān by others never alarmed classical Islam. Al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505) enumerates over twenty instances of internal abrogation in the Qur'ān. Al-Suyūṭī's times were still glorious days of Muslim historiography. He is himself the author of famous historical works like *Tarīkh-al-Khulafā'* and *Ṭabaqāt al-Mufassirīn.*

In fact Classical Islam related the subject of Naskh to Doctrine also when, for example, they said that فاتقوا الله حق تقاته was abrogated by فاتقوا الله ما استطعتم, (Suyuti: *ʿItqān,* Cairo, 1306/1888, Vol. II. p. 24, line I. The section of *ʿItqān* in question is في النوع السابع والاربعون ناسخه ومنسوخه [1], though this seems to be a forced incorporation of the idea of Naskh into Kalām by the Mutakallimīn.

The contexts [2] of these two verses establish that the latter does not abrogate the first. The former relates to the general subject of belief and signifies: "In the fundamental matter of belief fear Allah as much as is His due." The context of the latter verse relates to the subject of charity and signifies: "Fear Allah as much as you can afford," i.e. Give charity for fear of God as much as is within your means.

THERE IS NO ABROGATION BETWEEN THESE TWO VERSES

Soundly does Al-Suyūṭī remark (loc. cit. p. 22):

عرفت فساد صَنْعَ مَن أَدْخَلَ فى كُتُب النسخ كثيرا مِن آيات الاخبار والوعد والوَعيد

In recent times in India, Shah Waliyullāh reduced in his calculation, the number of abrogations to *four* in his *Al-Fauz al-Kabīr.* His efforts to minimise the cases of abrogation were hailed and are still hailed everywhere. Sir Sayyid, the next leading Mufassir, adopted the alternative Tafsīr that the passages of the Qur'ān mentioning abrogation meant abrogation of earlier scriptures by the Qur'ān, and not abrogation of earlier verses of the Qur'ān by its later verses. This is one of the very few statements in Sir Sayyid's "notoriously" unorthodox commentary which are admired. Both Shah Waliyullāh and Sir Sayyid, lived in days when most of their conception of Fiqh could at best be theoretical.

---

[1] The reference to Al-Suyūṭī within brackets is added later.

[2] The paragraph opening here and ending with the Arabic quotation, is added later.

Personally, the present writer does not see how the notion that the Qurʾān abrogates earlier scriptures, and not earlier revelation of itself, succeeds in avoiding the implication that God revised what He had revealed. WE MUST AVOID THAT IMPLICATION, but the effective way of doing so is to believe that abrogation, whether of earlier scriptures, or of earlier Quranic revelations, is to be understood as marking transitions by which the human race was to adapt itself smoothly to alternative ways of life offered by altered or advanced circumstances.

The anguish which the idea of historical context of the Qurʾān gives to some, seems on analysis to be two-fold:

I. To say that revelation had a historical context means that the Qurʾān was being composed in the life-time of the Prophet. This does not follow from the statement, if the belief in Divine Omniscience is co-ordinated here. By recognising Sabab al-Nuzūl none implied the temporal origin of the Divine Word.

II. The second question that gives anguish to some is that by relating the message of the Qurʾān to the situations of the Prophet's life-time we imply that the Quranic injunctions are not universally applicable. This apprehension is without grounds. We know that Tafsīr realised the relevance of Sabab al-Nuzūl to Khāṣṣ (Particular) and ʿĀmm (general) of injunctions, and the recognition of the injunctions Khaṣṣ to certain situations provides the only sanction supporting the fundamental conceptions of Qiyās and Ijtihād.

Human situations are inexhaustible. No book comprehensible by men can exhaust them, for such a book must be as big as the universe itself. And who will read such a big book? Therefore, it is only through the medium of a reasonable length of time that the spirit in which the more fundamental day to day situations of all times are to be met can be made known. No message can be sent to men except with reference to actual concrete situations. The eternal Word of God speaks with reference to the human situations and events of the last twenty-three years of the Prophet's life, in particular. These years are the historical context of the eternal Divine Word. It will be the task of the theologian to establish why the Eternal was related to those twenty-three years in particular as its Historical Context, and not IN THAT MANNER [1] to any other period of human history.

THE QURʾĀN WAS THERE WITH GOD ETERNALLY, BUT THE NUZŪL OF ITS PARTS AWAITED THE EVENTS WHICH WERE TO OCCUR AS THE SABAB OF THEIR NUZŪL, AND WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH THOSE ĀYĀT WERE TO BE UNDERSTOOD.

Islam has in its history the thought-stimulating phenomenon of a community of *perfect* Muslims like Khadijah, ʿAlī, Bilāl, and other early adherents who at a time were in possession of knowledge of only a small part of the Qurʾān. For example that part of the Qurʾān was

---

[1] The words "IN THAT MANNER" were not in capitals in the O.P.F.

sufficient at the date of Hijrah to make perfect Muslims which we know as Makkī. The justification of such an assumption will be that the situations which were to occur as the Asbāb al-Nuzūl of the Madanī part of the Qurʾān had not yet occurred. This phenomenon, when given solemn thought, engenders a spirit of great tolerance.

The historical approach to the Qurʾān has the benefit of affording conceptions of the Prophet's Nubuwwat and the Waḥy he received, which will be more readily acceptable to the modernised Muslim mind. Sir Sayyid made modifications on the overmechanical view of Waḥy by widening the denotation of the term, arguing on the basis of the Qurʾān itself that Waḥy is shared on levels low and high by all living beings. He quotes the verse: (xvi. 70)

وأوحى ربك إلى النحل أن اتخذى من الجبال بيوتا ومن الشجر ومما يعرشون

The present writer does not commit himself for or against this approach of Sir Sayyid's, but adds that [1] Sir Sayyid's modification does not draw support from the historical approach. The Prophet received the first revelation at his age of forty. Yet his life before that revelation was a perfect Uswā-i-Ḥasanah. The Prophet's spiritual and mental faculties were equipped to receive the ideas of the Qurʾān as true. Again, even after the first forty years of the Prophet's life, the deed and non-revelatory speech of the Prophet were perfectly harmonious with the spirit of the Qurʾān. The Divine enabling of the Prophet's mind as a pre-requisite of receiving Waḥy follows from the historical approach as a logical necessity.

By saying that the Qurʾān was sent down on the Prophet without forty years of pious effort [2] on the part of the Prophet before winning [3] the office of Receiver of Revelation, is to deprive him of his noble [4] greatness as a man.

In the light of this fact [5] we may also rethink the subject of occurrence of stories of earlier prophets and their nations in the Qurʾān. There are two possible views of this occurrence:

1. One is the possible view of the non-Muslims who might say that these stories in the Qurʾān are faulty reproductions and therefore to be dismissed as of no value. THIS VIEW IS CERTAINLY UNWORTHY
2. The second is the popular Muslim position that before Waḥy the Prophet never as much as heard the names of Mūsā, ʿĪsā, Isḥāq, Yaʿqūb, Ibrāhīm, Ilyās and other Prophets.

This view also has to be modified. THE ETERNAL WORD OF GOD DID BRING THE MOST MEANINGFUL VERSIONS OF THESE STORIES, but

[1] The part of the sentence up to this point is added later.
[2] The O.P.F. had the word "struggle" instead of "effort".
[3] The O.P.F. had the words "to win" instead of "before winning".
[4] The word "noble" is added later.
[5] The passage opening here and ending with the words "... what Lāt and Manāt were?" is added later.

to say that the Prophet's knowledge of the accounts of earlier prophets was zero before Waḥy is too extreme and unplausible a position. We know that the Prophet associated much with the Ḥanīfs who believed in earlier messengers of God. Can we Muslims in India and Pakistan conceive ourselves as completely ignorant of the names and stories of Krishna and Ramchandra? How can such an alert mind as that of the Prophet be conceived as never having heard any version of the stories of Moses, Abraham, Noah and others? Are we to believe that the Prophet's mind knew nothing about anything mentioned in the Qurʾān before Waḥy brought its knowledge? For example Lāt and Manāt are mentioned in the Qurʾān. Should we say that before the Qurʾān brought their mention to the Prophet, the Prophet did not know what Lāt and Manāt were?

In short [1], just as the Prophet's pre-Waḥy piety was similar to the piety enjoined by the Qurʾān, his pre-Waḥy knowledge of the former prophets and their nations was similar to, though not identical with, the knowledge that came later in revelatory language, with meanings more crystallised and words far more beautiful. Whether he got some knowledge of former prophets from *Biblical* stories or not, does not affect the revelatory nature of the Quranic versions of these stories. For the Qurʾān narrates these stories in its own language, to illustrate its own ideas of vice and virtue, of God's covenants and righteousness. In his lectures, Iqbāl refers with insight to the difference of intended implications in the respective versions of the story of the Fall of Adam in the Bible and the Qurʾān.

By placing the Qurʾān in its historical context alone will the modernised [2] young Muslim regain an attitude of respect for the Holy Book. It is *true* that the Eternal Word of God is addressed equally to us. Yet the fact remains that it was immediately addressed to be understood also by the simple men of the 7th century A.D. Could we profitably be addressed in the language and intellectual discourse of the year 4000 A.D.? How could the Arabs of thirteen centuries ago be addressed in the language of 1957? Only by realising this, will the modernised Muslim stop expecting 20th century sophistication from the Qurʾān. In our objective study of the Qurʾān we must proceed by looking for what the Qurʾān meant to its immediate addressees according to their language and idiom. In this way also the Qurʾān is related to its historical context.

The glory of the Qurʾān is recognised best by recognising its own ideas and understood in its own terms and within its own literal and historical contexts. Its glory is not realised by making it yield artificially every latest scientific theory which might easily become obsolete in a decade.

---

[1] The words "In short" were added later.
[2] The O.P.F. had the wood "uninformed" instead of "modernised".

The Qurʾān is not a compendium of Divine Knowledge. That knowledge we know is infinite. The Qurʾān is not an Encyclopaedia. Encyclopaedias have to get revised. Let us not look for the theories of Einstein in the Qurʾān. Let us pay heed to what the Holy Book teaches us to be good men. There lies its essence.

When the Qurʾān says: "We liberated him (Abraham) from the fire" (فَأَنجَيْنَاهُ مِنَ النَّارِ), the intention here is not to disclose the scientific truth that fire has the quality of burning things. That inference can follow, but it is off the intention. Sir Sayyid, however, insists innocently that *that* inference is not identical here. The Qurʾan contains statements of implication for science, but those implications are off the intention.

The discussion of the Asbāb al-Nuzūl resolves another very great question: the difference of belief between Ahl al-Ḥadīth and Ahl al-Qurʾān. The latter must realise the inescapable reality that the entire Tafsīr literature is based on a book of Ḥadīth, the Tafsīr of Imām al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) which has materials which none of the Ṣiḥaḥ has.

One most effective way of lending historical perspective to the whole view of Islamic thought would be to collect a full narrative of Tafsīr. Every generation subsequent to that of the Prophet commented on each and every word of the Qurʾān. The story of Tafsīr can establish a unity of perspective by having behind it the original meaning of the Qurʾān as a landmark from which distances of time could be measured.

It is one thing to say that the Tafsīr of Fakhr-i-Rāzī is an Ashᶜarite answer to Muᶜtazilite exegesis, and quite another to realise [1] the significance of this fact as [2] actually showing in the comments on more than 5000 verses of the Qurʾān. Comparative study of Tafsīrs will promote our faculties of judgement by bringing into our consciousness the different historical contexts of each Tafsīr work, the difference of learning possessed by each author, of level of sophistication, of theological constitution, of power of co-ordination, of level of consistency, of sectarian bias, of profundity on grammatical and lexical issues, of stamina and style and so on.

Another equally important field where the interpretations on the Qurʾān can be studied is the non-Tafsīr literature. This will often show how sects and thinkers of various persuasions draw on the Qurʾān and often divorce Quranic phrases from their literal contexts to suit their own ideas.

But by far the most fruitful way of writing a history of Tafsīr will be to write THE HISTORY OF EACH AND EVERY QURANIC WORD'S IN-

[1] The O.P.F. had a full-stop here by misprint.
[2] The word "as" was misprinted "is" in the O.P.F.

TERPRETATION IN TAFSĪR AND NON-TAFSĪR LITERATURE. Deeper study of the history of Tafsīr of Quranic vocabulary together with the history of Arabic and Persian lexicography will reveal greatly fascinating facts of mutual influence between Tafsīr and Lughah.

One great fruit of such study will be the long overdue objective and systematic [1] disentanglement of the meaning of the Holy Book from its theological interpretation.

The writer of this paper wrote his doctoral thesis at Cambridge which brought to light very considerable evidence of the difference of Quranic thought from Islamic thought of some centuries later [2].

This consciousness of the difference between the Quranic thought and the theological world-view does not necessitate a repudiation of theology. Often when the theologian drew on non-Quranic genius, he was giving important content to Islam. The conception of Divine Being in Greek terms of the Essence (Dhāt) and Ṣifāt (Attributes) which became the universal theological representation of the idea of God, is the most outstanding example. This representation is of non-Quranic genius, and yet it fulfilled a spiritual need in the history of Islam.

HISTORICAL SENSE APPLIED TO OUR STUDY OF ḤADĪTH

A ḥadīth stating that the Prophet expressed his disapproval of the [3] Khārijite sect is evidently fabricated, for the Khārijites came into existence after the Prophet's death. And yet this ḥadīth is not valueless. It is a precious evidence of what the anti-Khārijites said about Khārijites. A ḥadīth is not merely genuine or forged. It is a piece of religious literature in itself. Much of the Ḥadīth literature can be arranged historically which is a treasure of information on Muslim dogmatics.

The direct effect of the historical attitude on our political thinking will be through realising that the Khilāfat-i-Rāshida, which is spoken of as the period of perfected Muslim society, WAS NEVER A FINISHED WHOLE. IT WAS A FEVERISH PROCESS. One can find great developments within a *single* year in the Caliphate of any of the first four Khulafā'. The personality of Ḥazrat ʿUthmān is divided into ʿUthmānu-Sitta-Sinīn and the ʿUthmān of the later days. All historical works speak of the abundant Awwaliyyat of each of the four Khulafā' with chronology. The Awwaliyyat of ʿUmar did not exist in the times of Abū Bakr.

Moreover, this period was preceded by a process of growth in the Prophet's days and was followed by centuries of glorious developments which gave us new treasures of thought and commendable ways of living.

---

[1] The O.P.F. had the word "scientific" instead of "objective and systematic".
[2] The O.P.F. had the words "at large" instead of "of some centuries later".
[3] The word "the" was omitted in the O.P.F. by the printers.

The historical method will show that Islam incorporated very much of the administrative system of the Sassanian Empire. To us in Pakistan it will demonstrate that the Mughals retained many devices of administration from Hindu kingdoms. It will show that the richest ideas of Classical Muslim Theology found formulation in the philosophical phraseology of Greek masters. It will make us tolerant by revealing to us rich diversity within our past and will make us own our entire past. It will bring to our consciousness affairs like that of Aurangzeb and Sarmad. We mention both saying *Raḥmatullāh ᶜalaihi,* yet one of them had the other killed for what he thought was heresy. It will show us how many ideas were thought to be heresies first and were idealised later. It will show us that there would be no poetry of Ḥāfiẓ had there been no prohibition in Islam. It will discover for us precedents in our past for useful measures which might otherwise appear to be innovations, or at least it will show that others in the past also had to do unprecedented things. It will make us realise the principle that each country has a right to handle the details of religious matters according to its judgements based on knowledge of native problems which foreign Muslims may not have. IT WILL SATISFY THE URGE TO RELIGIOUS DEVOTION. ALSO, AS DATA OF THE SCIENCES OF SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIONS, THE HISTORICAL STUDY OF ISLAM WILL SATISFY THE HUNGER FOR EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE.

II. FILL THE VOID OF KALĀM

In a world of growing internationalism where no community will continue to have sharply distinct jurisprudence of its own, the future of Islam will be fortified better by giving attention to the sadly forsaken Kalām. The Muslim states which are ceasing to preserve application of Fiqh to the new international life will preserve the Muslim spirit by a sense of responsibility motivated by an intimate consciousness of the vigilant Lord of Justice made known in the Qurᵓān. This can be accomplished only by reviving Kalām. By exertion of intellect in that direction alone can we get rid of the excessive dominance of the idea of predestination of our action which makes us pessimists and stunts our activity.

III. STUDY[1] COMPARATIVE RELIGIONS

We must realise the value of all religion as a fundamental of human existence, and speak of the relative merits of Islam from actual knowledge of other religions, not from ignorance. Can any Muslim scholar in the whole Islamic world claim with conviction that he knows more about Christianity than the average Christian Islamicist in a Western University knows about Islam? We expect liberality

[1] The O.P.F. had the word "OF" here by misprint.

from others, but have we produced one counterpart of Carlyle in Islam even though the place of Jesus in our belief is high among prophets? Christianity is the faith of one-third of the world's population. Has not a study of the Christian society a commensurate claim in our study of the international world in which we live? If the centuries of learning about Islam in Western Universities with its massive products were 'motivated', do we Muslims not have as a kind of counterpart a 'motivated' ignorance about Christianity? No religion in the world today possesses such a fascinating story of the battle of Religion and Science as does Christianity.

Muhammad Daud Rahbar

THE STUDY OF MUSLIM ETHICS

Of the utmost importance for the appreciation of a national or religious culture is an understanding of its moral values. In Muslim ethics this involves a careful study of the precepts and admonitions that are to be found in the Qurʾān and in the Traditions, including a review of the circumstances in which they were enunciated, along with instances of their subsequent acceptance and continued application.

The teachings of the Qurʾān and the traditional sayings and conduct of Muḥammad are as fundamental for Muslim ethics as for Muslim law. And since these teachings and sayings are basic for both the ethics and the law, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between that which has become a law and that which is recognized as an ethical principle. There are cases where Islamic law has been determined by statements in the Qurʾān because of the Muslim belief in Divine authority and inspiration, notwithstanding apparent deviation from accepted ethical principles. In the course of time laws of that type have had to be restricted in their application by qualifying amendments, on the premise that it was never intended that laws based on the Qurʾān should require conduct that is unethical. To the same purpose analogical deduction (*qiyās*) was permitted, particularly when the direction in the Qurʾān was insufficiently explicit.

Similarly there are requirements of the Muslim religion in matters of faith and worship that are not based primarily on accepted ethical principles. The first consideration has been the sanction of divine authority, for the word *islām* means submission to the will of God. Human experience is to be rationalized in the light of God's revealed word, as declared in the Qurʾān, and as interpreted and exemplified in the Traditions. The Muslim believer considers that these teachings in the Qurʾān have been magnificently exemplified in the life of Muḥammad, and that there are ample records in the Traditions of things that their prophet did or said which corroborate and illustrate the divine teachings. [1]

The call to obey the will of God by witnessing that "there is no god but God" is not the complete *kalimah* (confession). A second part follows: "and Muḥammad is the apostle of God." The importance of this second declaration is stated in Al-Shahrastānī's summary of the orthodox Muslim belief: *"Muḥammad, the perfect man, is the climax of man's evolution, as Islām is the climax of successive laws."* [2] It may be said that the example of Muḥammad, as it can be determined from the Qurʾān and the Tradition, has continued to be the objective

---

[1] These records are voluminous, but the modern student of Arabic sources for the study of Islam is greatly helped by Wensinck's most useful Index, entitled "A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Traditions."

[2] The *Summa Philosophiae* of Al-Shahrastānī, ed. and trans. by Alfred Guillaume, pp. 158-159.

standard of conduct among Muslim peoples, so much so indeed that we are not far wrong when we speak of *Muhammadan* ethics. A recent translation of Ibn Isḥāq's *Sīrat Rasūl Allāh* by Professor A. Guillaume has been published as "The Life of Muḥammad." For those who wish to get at the sources for Muḥammad's biography this comprehensive work is essential.

It is in his spirit of God-consciousness, however, that you meet a Muslim at his best, when he remembers that God sees exactly what he is doing. For this belief he finds frequent assurance in the Qurʾān:

> "And wherever ye are, He is with you; and God beholdeth all your actions" (Surah lvii. 4).
> "He beholdeth what ye do" (Surah xi. 14).
> "Verily God on what ye do doth look" (Surah ii. 257).
> "And God is witness over all things. Dost thou not see that God knoweth all that is in the Heaven and all that is in the Earth? Three persons speak not privately together, but He is their fourth; nor five but He is their sixth; nor fewer nor more, but wherever they be He is with them" (Surah lviii. 7-8).

He believes that God Who sees him, is a God of power:

> "Verily God is Almighty!" (Surah ii. 19).
> "Verily thy Lord is the Strong, the Mighty!" (Surah xi. 69).
> "The Truth; and He is the High, the Great" (Surah xxxiv. 22).

He loves to think of God as a God of mercy:

> "Praise be to God, Lord of the worlds!
> The Compassionate, the Merciful!" (Surah i. 1-2).
> "Despair not of God's mercy, for all sins
> doth God forgive. Gracious, Merciful is He." (Surah xxxix. 54).
> "God is Indulgent, Merciful!" (Surah xxxiii. 59).

He thinks of the bounties his God bestows:

> "How many animals are there which provide not
> their own food? God feedeth them and you" (Surah xxix. 60).
> "And He is the Beneficent!" (Surah lii. 28).
> "And if you would reckon up the favors of God
> you could not count them" (Surah xvi. 18).

Consequently, from the believer's point of view, whatever is contrary to the expressed or implied will of God is forbidden. This is his foregone conclusion, as a Muslim, but he recognizes that the verses in the Qurʾān that may be applied to questions of conduct are exceedingly numerous, and that sometimes they appear to contradict or even to abrogate one another. As a result he feels that he needs to have the co-ordinating disquisitions and expositions of his theologians and religious teachers. For him the laws of conduct are the requirements of his religion, not only for himself as an individual, but for the entire Muslim community, and even for all mankind.

THE IMPACT OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

In the Middle Ages, when Muslim thinkers—especially lawyers, physicians, and theologians—gained a knowledge of Greek philosophy, they came to see that some of the requirements, which they had considered to have been established by revelation to Muḥammad as the will of Allāh, could be rationalized and confirmed in human experience after the manner of the philosophers. Al-Fārābī (d. 950), the celebrated early commentator on Aristotle, had studied in Baghdad under the Christian physician Yuḥannā ibn Haitān. He worked also with Abū Bishr Mattā, a Nestorian translator of Greek works, in the writing of his commentaries on the treatises in the *Organon,* and particularly in his commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Later on, Ibn Rushd (d. 1198), "the greatest Arab philosopher of Spain, known in Europe as Averroes, prepared a series of textbook commentaries on Aristotle, *the small* for first year university study, *the medium* for the second, and *the large* for the third. He also wrote a commentary on Plato's *Republic*" (*Ency. of Islam,* vol. ii, pp. 31 and 410 ff).

These translations were supplemented in the course of their progress by classifications of virtues and vices, with discussions of guiding principles, which were set forth in several brief manuals of Ethics. Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAdī (d. 974), a Syrian-Christian translator and author, had written the first of these manuals, which he called "The Correction of Dispositions" (*Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*). Ibn Maskawaihī (d. 1030), who had worked as a librarian in Shiraz and Rayy, followed the outline given by Yaḥyā ibn ᶜAdī in the writing of his Arabic text, to which he gave the same name. In "The Revivification of the Religious Sciences" (*Iḥyāʾ ᶜUlūm al-Dīn*), which was written by Al-Ghazālī (d. 111), many ethical questions are dealt with from a religious and practical point of view. In the Third Quarter of this comprehensive work, in which he dealt more especially with ethical principles, he made use of the work of Ibn Maskawaihī. And several of Al-Ghazālī's smaller books have to do with ethics and psychology as a background for his mysticism. Considerably later, Nāṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274) found a scholar's refuge in a mountain fortress with the "Assassins." It was at a time of general political unrest, and he busied himself with astronomical tables and with the task of preparing in the Persian language a much expanded revision of Ibn Maskawaihī's book on Ethics. He changed the name, however, and called his book in honor of his Ismāᶜīlī patron, the *Akhlāq-i-Nāṣirī.* A more popular work, which is a summary in the Persian language of these older books on Ethics, was written by Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī (d. 1501). It was called "Flashes of Splendour Concerning Excellencies of Dispositions." In 1839 this book was prepared in the English language, with free condensation and rearrangement, by W. F. Thompson, as *"The Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan People."* It has long been out of print and is difficult to procure.

These books show the impact of Greek philosophy on Muslim thinking. There was a diligent effort to reconcile religious tenets with the new philosophical outlook, and this resulted, in the East as in the West, in a general acceptance of the scholastic methods. Both the Christian and the Muslim theologies became more defensive than receptive, and more dogmatic than convincing. The exchange of ideas was stimulated, and yet at the same time limited and hampered, by the Crusades. What could be learned from the Greeks, however, was recognized by Muslims as pre-Christian, non-traditional and avowedly rational; and as such was the more readily accepted. It is noteworthy, also, that in the 13th century, when Bar Hebraeus, the Christian Syriac author, wrote the *Ethikon,* he made free use of Al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā'*, particularly in his Third Book on "The Purifying of the Soul from Vices," in which his chapter headings parallel those of Al-Ghazālī [3].

For the study of Muslim-Christian relations, the influence of Greek philosophy on the psychology and the ethics of peoples in Christian as well as in Muslim countries is most significant. On neither side did academic freedom prevail, and for a true appreciation of books that were written during the Middle Ages it is necessary to keep in mind the determining or restricting influence of historical events and situations. All of this background study has much to contribute towards an understanding of the ethical teaching of Muslim literature [4]. For Muslim ethics points both backwards and forwards. Looking backwards it fosters a careful scrutiny of the teachings that are to be found in the Qur'ān and in the Tradition; and looking forward, it leads to an evaluation, from the standpoint of ethics, of subsequent moral instruction that is to be found in Muslim literature—history, poetry, popular sayings and anecdotes.

THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUE JUDGEMENTS

In line with the modern Muslim desire for an evaluation of their moral instruction it may be observed that western thought has been making a significant contribution. For Ethics in western thought has been enriched by considerable philosophical attention to value judgments. Value has been broadly defined by John Laird [5] as "the relative status of a thing according to its real or supposed worth, usefulness or importance." He observed that Descartes had pointed out the need to estimate matters according to *la juste valeur.* He recalled that Kant had stated that "whatever has reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a *market value*; whatever,

[3] A. J. Wensinck, *Bar Hebraeus's Book of the Dove,* which includes translations of chapters from the *Ethikon,* Leyden, 1919, xvii ff.

[4] For an outline of this development, with numerous illustrations, consult the author's *Studies in Muslim Ethics,* S.P.C.K., London, 1953.

[5] *The Idea of Value,* pp. xv-xix.

without presupposing a want, corresponds to a certain taste, ... has a *fancy value*; but that which constitutes the condition under which alone anything can be an end in itself, this has not merely a relative worth, i.e. value, but an *intrinsic worth,* i.e. dignity."

Professor Laird has also reminded us that Lotze, in his *Microcosmos,* considered that "in its feeling for the value of things and their relations, our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the principles of logical investigation, it has an indispensable instrument of experience," and that Lotze wrote in his *Metaphysics* that "the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics. I admit that the expression is not exact; but I still feel certain of being on the right track, when I seek in that which *should be* the ground of that which *is*."

It is interesting to remember that Spinoza also wrote of "the absolute values of excellence or rational perfection, in contrast to the relative values of natural election and of psychological interest." And according to Bernard Bosanquet, "things can only be valued rightly when valued in their whole nature, and that (value) they only have in the complete being to which they belong" [6]. He too made a distinction between relative values, in the light of some particular use or preference, and those intrinsic or ultimate values that Ethics seeks to discover.

In William Marshall Urban's *Fundamentals of Ethics,* the idea of value is accepted as "the basal concept of Ethics." It is "a body of knowledge which we may call systematized valuing" [7]. Things that satisfy desire we call "good"; things that further or conserve life have "survival value;" but "that alone is ultimately and intrinsically valuable that leads to the development of selves, or to self-realization."

Cooperation on the part of Muslims and Christians in the study of value judgments that lead to self-realization will have much to contribute to mutual appreciation and respect. And in this connection it would be in place to include a statement made by W. H. Sorley, in his *Moral Values and the Idea of God.* He says: "It is often forgotten that man himself is an agent in the world's changing course, and that his agency is determined by his ideals: that he selects between possible lines of action and that his selection may be determined by his judgment of what is good or better. Human agency is thus one of the factors of that world of experience which both science and philosophy set out to explain; and human agency is effected by conceptions or ideals of value."

This position Prof. Sorley has illustrated by showing how "happiness or pleasure belongs in some degree to every realization of value. It attaches itself to value of every kind, instead of being one kind amongst the others." He has explained how appreciation of the beautiful is attached to some aesthetic value; approval of the good to some

---

[6] *The Principle of Individuality and Value,* p. xxxi.
[7] *Fundamentals of Ethics,* p. 6 ff.

moral value, and acceptance of the true to some intellectual value. It is easy to agree that a personal response to any of these values brings with it a certain happiness or pleasure, which is part of self-realization.

THE SITUATION AT THE PRESENT TIME

Much in the same way as Muslim thinkers were led to consider Greek philosophy in the Middle Ages, they are now coming increasingly under the influence of a modern scientific outlook on the world in which they live. They are not satisfied, however, with merely factual statements: in this case also they demand value judgments. Each inquiring mind has a potential for such judgments. This means that present-day Muslims have questions that they want to be able to answer rationally in the light of their own experience: questions, for example, about human rights, as they see them recognized and protected in the family, the city or the state. In the light of new knowledge they are ready to reconsider their familiar ethical principles and to modify their legalistic moral codes. They are demanding that modern expositors of the Qur'ān and the Traditions now set themselves to bring out primarily what makes sense in modern thinking.

It is a time for Christian influence that is patient, enlightened and consecrated. For this timely Christian influence, is it not advisable that a much larger number of those who are in position to work as friends of Muslims should take the pains to make very definite preparation to assist in ways that will be effective in their intellectual and spiritual adjustments? They will almost certainly want to be able to discuss fundamental ethical questions with those who have had considerable moral instruction from books by Muslim writers.

They will see that reflection that is based on scientific observation and study soon encounters the question of the evaluation of moral ideas. Has there been a gradual emergent evolution in the course of which human decisions with reference to what is good or bad have come to be customary and accepted? Or should we prefer to believe that human recognition and appreciation of moral values have but a part to play though tremendously important, in a vast and purposive world order that is dependent for its continuance, as well as for its origin, on the will of God? In the present connection, perhaps it is sufficient to observe that belief in theistic evolution affords a common ground for Christians and Muslims when they undertake to study ethical problems together. Dependence on one God, the Creator and Preserver of the universe, is accepted in both religions, and it is usually conceded that it is man's religious duty to honor, and to worship, and to obey God. Muslim thinkers who know the conclusions that were reached in their own old books are likely to be the very men and women who are eager now to evaluate them in relation to their more modern studies. You may meet them in their youth as students, in their home countries or in foreign lands, or you may come to know

them as professors in university centers, or as diplomats, merchants, or government officials.

Readers of *The Muslim World,* who are familiar with the program of the "Continuing Committee on Muslim-Christian Cooperation" will appreciate the significance of a statement in one of their recent conferences in relation to value judgments: "Most important of all is dialogue, that is, constructive meeting between Christians and Muslims devoid of dispute, on the level of mutual respect. We shall not gloss over our differences, rather, let us try to reach a situation of harmony based upon objective assessment of each other's values" [8].

THE NATURE OF JESUS' VALUE JUDGMENTS

Whether a person is called upon to serve in a hospital, school or college, to visit with government officials or interested friends and neighbours, or to counsel with young people on their problems, the more he considers what is truly worth while in life the more he will come to appreciate Christ's dynamic ethical discrimination. Along with the healing touch, He employed the value judgment, as He set forth standards of what ought to be over against beliefs that were generally accepted. We learn from Him that happiness or blessing is reserved for the poor in spirit—for those that mourn, for the meek, those that hunger and thirst after righteousness, for the merciful, the pure in heart, the peacemakers, and those who are persecuted for righteousness' sake. In each of these experiences the mind can be turned toward God in trustful receptivity.

Jesus knew well that in matters of personal conduct most people are ready to follow what has been handed down to them on second-hand authority. He was acquainted with those conventional interpretations of the law, and those specious judgments that had come to be generally accepted. He declared in His preaching: "Ye have heard that it was said," and then, after definite reference to the things He had in mind, He spoke incisively and forcefully, "But I say unto you." He spoke by the authority of personal knowledge, observation and experience, setting forth conclusions which he had rationally determined and prayerfully confirmed. He too had to know "what was said," and to see how it had worked out imperfectly, in order to set forth his own powerful declarations as the veritable word of God, like a two-edged sword that is "quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart."

The key to the amazing demands of Jesus' new thought lay in the premise with which He found himself challenged, "if thou art the son of God." In a long period of prayer this premise was confirmed in His mind and heart to the point of assurance. He would serve, therefore, in word and deed, to comfort and to enlighten. Those who were to follow Him were to face up to this premise also, for even in them

[8] Dr. Trimingham, *Newsletter*, Sept. 1957.

God's Spirit of truth and love was to dwell, and they too would be called "sons of God." On this exalted level, in a person to person relationship to God, they were to repudiate the customary practice of retaliation, for example, and learn to forgive. This was in the light of the supreme ethical and spiritual obligations that they were to accept along with the privileges of sonship. "Ye therefore shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect."

In modern times as well, it follows that those who are to carry messages of God's love and truth to their Muslim friends need to know *what has been said* in the Qur'ān and in the Traditions, and in the books of moral instruction that are read in the homes and taught in the schools. As they travel from village to village, and as they have opportunity to read from the New Testament the carefully chosen messages of Jesus to those who have never understood them correctly, they may have to answer this question: "Did Jesus speak these words for Muslims too?"

With an acquired awareness of the ethical conceptions of a Muslim audience, whether it be a group in a mountain village, possibly with highway robbers among them, or an assembly of students and professors in a great university, or a gathering of patients and their friends at a worship service in a Christian hospital, a person is in a better position to arouse interest, to hold attention, and to direct thought. He wants individuals to feel that he really knows already and honestly appreciates their best attainments and their highest aspirations, but he also wants to lead them to join him in looking to Christ's teaching and example for further guidance, comfort, forgiveness and hope.

A SUGGESTED METHOD

A subject of discourse can be introduced after the manner of the Apostle Paul on Mars Hill. For when he declared to the assembly of Greeks, with whose literature he was acquainted, that the *unknown* God "is not far from each one of us," he went on to say, "In Him we live and move and are, as even some of your poets have said." The apt quotation of favorite quatrains from the Persian poets will be appreciated almost anywhere in the Muslim world. If they express a sense of God's continuous sustaining power, or some significant judgment as to what is worth while in life or praiseworthy in conduct, a Christian teacher or preacher can make use of such quotations, not only to show his own appreciation of the cultural background of his Muslim friends, but also as a natural introduction to those particular teachings of Jesus that he wants to set forth most effectively.

There are many books on the ethical teachings of Jesus from which outlines may be taken for suggestive comparisons with somewhat similar teachings that are found in the Qur'ān or other Muslim books for moral instruction. To choose but one instance, in a book of Bishop

Oxnam's, *The Ethical Ideals of Jesus in a Changing World,* the very first chapter is based on an outline for which the author says he was indebted to class notes that he had taken from lectures by Washington Gladden, Walter Rauschenbusch and Harry F. Ward. Here is a condensation of this outline.

CHRIST'S SOCIAL IDEALS

1. Men and not things are the goal of social living.
2. The Solidarity of the Human Family.
3. The Supremacy of the Common Good.
4. Equal Rights for All: the right to be well born, the right to a home, the right to an education, the right to work, and the right to leisure, and cultural and spiritual development.
5. Cooperation and not selfish competition is the law of progress.
6. Love and not force is the social bond.

Under the main headings of some such outline a teacher may add references to both the Old and the New Testaments and also to the Qur'ān, with the further addition of sayings of Muḥammad, or Muslim proverbs, or verses of poetry that are pertinent to the subject. Then in the class or discussion group, watch how value judgments will come forth for consideration, and how Jesus' moral authority will assert itself.

Terrace Gardens,
Lakeland, Florida

DWIGHT M. DONALDSON

THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Trevelyan in his *History of England* sums up the celebrated stand of Sir Edward Coke against James I in these words:

> "In essence, the quarrel was this: James and Charles held, with the students of Roman Law, that the will of the Prince was the source of law, and that the Judges were 'lions under the throne,' bound to speak as he directed them. Coke, on the other hand, in the spirit of the English Common Law, conceived of law as having an independent existence of its own, set above the King as well as above his subjects, and bound to judge impartially between them..."

The doctrine of the supremacy of law has been called the outstanding contribution of English civilization, transcending even Parliamentary democracy, Shakespearean poetry, and the industrial Revolution. Events in recent years suggest that the question of the rule of law in the Islamic countries of the Middle East is of more than academic interest. Coups d'état, suspensions of constitutions, "treason trials," the establishment of authoritarian régimes, and the easy disregard of civil rights, give rise to doubt as to whether there is a rule of law in our sense in this area.

It can be shown that during the millenium of classical Islam and right down until recent decades there was a rule of law in the Middle Eastern area, albeit an imperfect one; and that the net effect of the importation of western concepts and methods (the "impact of the West") has been a negative one. To borrow Coke's metaphor, the ruler in classical Islam had lions under the throne in the form of his Islamic law judges. But he could not command them. He could leash them and unleash them, but they listened to the command of the Sacred Law which was beyond his control. Now, however, the ruler has equipped himself with powerful new lions borrowed from the West who are fully subservient to his command, and has also asserted his control over the Sacred Law itself. As a result, law in the Islamic countries of the Middle East has become largely the unchecked instrument of the state.

THE SACRED LAW OF CLASSICAL ISLAM

In Islamic theory, the Sharīᶜah claims to regulate all the actions of men, public and private, social and individual. In theory, it makes no concession to Caesar, and asserts its authority over political man in all his acts of government as well as over private man in his prayers. This idea is summed up in the maxim: *Islām Dīn wa Daulah*: "Islam is religion and state."

Much more than a legal system properly speaking, the Sharīᶜah is the comprehensive catalogue of God's commands and recommendations laid down for the guidance of men. How and what to eat,

when to wash, what to wear, how and when to pray and fast — these and similar matters are treated on the same basis and with just as much meticulous concern as matters more strictly legal, such as marriage and divorce, or commercial transactions, or crime. Governing the whole range of man's relations with God and society, and in the absence of any organized Muslim church hierarchy, the Sharīᶜah is incomparably the central institution of Islam.

Wider in scope than law in the western conception, Muslim law is also more complicated in its judgments. In western law, an act is either lawful or not lawful. Whether or not such an act is also decent, good, pious, ethical, moral, or in good taste is beside the point. Not so in Muslim law. The Sharīᶜah considers a given act — depending on circumstances — to be mandatory (*farḍ* or *wājib*), commendable or recommended (*sunnah*), permissible (*ḥalal* or *jāᵓiz*), reprehensible (*makrūh*), or forbidden (*ḥaram*). The highly normative character of the Sharīᶜah is a fact of the greatest importance in the history of Islam. For in setting up an eternal, unchanging, divinely sanctioned standard of human conduct, the Sharīᶜah was the decisive factor, over the centuries, in creating a stable, unified, orderly and law abiding Muslim community out of widely diverse peoples, and a social fabric that was proof for over a thousand years against invasions, revolts, civil wars, famines, and all other calamities and political vicissitudes. The Sharīᶜah may truly be called the backbone of Muslim society.

The normative quality of Muslim law is not accidental. It is a product of the process by which the law came into being. Immediately after the death of the Prophet in 632 A. D., the Arabs exploded out of their inhospitable peninsula and began the sweeping conquests which in less than a century carried them to dominion over an area stretching westward through North Africa and Spain to the Pyrenees, and eastward through Persia and far into central Asia. During this period, generally speaking, there was no such thing as Muslim law. The religion itself was only commencing to be elaborated beyond its primitive beginnings; and if the Arab conquerors were Muslims, they were so at a time when the term hardly meant anything more than Arab.

But there was law, of course. The new empire had to be administered; and in the process, a body of administrative practice was built up which together with customary practice was to constitute the main raw material of the Sharīᶜah. By and large, the Arab rulers of the first century and their governors followed a policy of empiricism in solving the host of new administrative problems. Where precedents arising out of their background of Arab customary law (e.g., the arbitral method of settling disputes) or introduced by Prophetic innovation (e.g., punishments for certain delicts; a modified law of divorce, marriage, and inheritance) seemed appropriate, they were followed. Administrative and legal habits, institutions and concepts which the conquerors found in the civilized organized areas of Byzantine Egypt

and Syria and Sassanid Iraq and Persia were taken over in wholesale lots (e.g., tax methods, and the institutions of market inspector and complaints tribunal). Talmudic law and the canon law of eastern Christian churches made their contributions; and beyond doubt, there was in addition a good deal of improvisation.

Generally speaking, the Arab administrators of the first century of Islam were successful in evolving a corpus of administrative practice out of these kaleidoscopic origins which, if not entirely integrated and coherent, was none the less equal to the demands of governing a vast and turbulent empire and of securing the revenues from the subject cities and provinces necessary to support a large military organization and to prosecute almost continuous war.

In a natural delegation of authority, Arab governors began early to put the business of deciding disputes and assigning penalties into the hands of secretaries for legal affairs, or *qāḍīs,* whose role was initially similar to that of the magistrates in the recently displaced Byzantine administration. The "jurisprudence" of these early *qāḍīs* contributed much to the formation of the recognized body of administrative and legal habit which had developed by the end of the first century of Arab rule.

The Sharīᶜah, the Sacred Law of Islam, began as a protest against the customs and habits of Arab society including this body of administrative practice. During the initial century, it is possible to identify two main tendencies. The one, already touched upon, involved the organization and administration of a new empire, and the imposing on it of an Arab stamp. The other tendency was an Islamic one; and toward the end of the first century it became dominant. In the vanguard of the Islamicizing tendency were groups of pious scholars in various cities of the empire who had begun to examine and criticize Ummayyad administrative practice and the customary practices of the people at large, using as criteria the precepts of the new religion. No doubt motivations of piety were re-inforced by political and other considerations. In any case, the objective was reform. They began by criticizing popular and administrative practice piecemeal, and gradually went on to elaborate in more and more detail a system of things as they ought to be, as compared with what they were in fact. In this way, Muslim law acquired its decisively normative character.

As time went on and the Islamicizing tendency gained more and more the ascendency in the Arab empire, pious scholars began to progress from criticism of the existing state of affairs to the systematization and logical elaboration of their earlier efforts. Legal thought for its own sake became a motivation; and gradually the main outlines of the Sharīᶜah took form. As it gained in definition and prestige, it began to have an influence on the practice of the governors and their *qāḍīs.* But the decisive step in this direction remained to be taken by the ᶜAbbāsids.

In 750 A.D., a little more than a century after the beginning of the Arab conquests, the Persian-based ᶜAbbāsid dynasty, promising to establish the reign of God upon earth and, riding the egalitarian appeal of Islam to the non-Arab masses of the empire, overthrew the Arab hegemony of the Ummayyads. Under the ᶜAbbāsids Muslim law came as close as it was ever to come, except for a time many centuries later under the Ottoman Turks, to establishing itself in fact as well as in theory over administrative and legal practice. The great innovation of the ᶜAbbāsids was to centralize the appointment of the *qāḍīs,* and to select them from the ranks of the pious legal scholars. Except insofar as the *qāḍīs* had hitherto applied in practice certain Quranic rules about inheritance, divorce, and the like, this departure established for the first time a direct nexus between the Sacred Law and everyday practice: a substantial part of the practice was put into the hands of specialists who were required to make decisions in accordance with the Sharīᶜah.

On the face of it, the Sharīᶜah had captured, so to speak, the chief legal officers of the empire. A bridge had been thrown across the growing gulf between theory and fact, and a foothold secured in administrative practice. But to complete its victory, the Sharīᶜah would have had to go on to establish its practical authority over the other administrative officers of the empire including the ruler himself. This, in spite of the theory and in spite of continuing efforts, it was never able to accomplish. Although comparatively complete in matters of worship, family law, and even commercial transactions and private affairs in general, the Sharīᶜah was sketchy indeed when it came to public law; and this very fact is a measure of its failure to bring conduct of state under its sway. The Sharīᶜah did supply some guidance in matters relating to the holy war (jihād), and to the collection and disbursement of certain taxes. It specified punishments for certain crimes, and it set out in general terms the public duties incumbent on the ruling authority such as defense of the frontiers and maintenance of the religion. But for the men who had to administer the Muslim empire, the Sharīᶜah could not in its incompleteness and rigidity establish itself in practice as an all-sufficient law.

The wide gaps it left in its attempt to regulate the conduct of state continued to be filled by the administrative initiative of Muslim rulers and their lieutenants who were faced with the day-to-day necessities of government. A large and developing body of secular administrative practice thus remained outside the precincts of the Sacred Law and often in direct contradiction to it; and it was a practice which included, in fact if not in theory, all the functions of government—legislative, judicial, and executive.

Well aware of all this, Islamic legal theory sought to maintain the Sharīᶜah claim to omnicompetence by bringing the ruler's administrative practice into the fold of Islam. But to do so, it had to make all

the concessions. It was forced to recognize the wide discretionary authority (*siyāsah*) the ruler already had, and to regularize it in the name of "common sense" (*istiḥsān*), or "consideration of the public good" (*istiṣlāḥ* or *maṣāliḥ mursalah*), or simply "necessity" (*ḍarūrah*). In return, the ruler was exhorted to keep his administrative practice "sound," "religious," and "just" — within the bounds of the Law (*siyāsah sharᶜiyyah*).

If the Sharīᶜah failed to "capture" the ruler and his other administrative officials and was forced to recognize their practical autonomy, even its new monopoly over the *qāḍīs* was an incomplete one. For although the law they were thenceforth supposed to apply was the Sharīᶜah which was held to be divinely established, eternal, and independent of the ruler's control and which was vested in legal handbooks and interpreted by a corps of jurists (*ulamāᵓ*) and jurisconsults (*muftīs*) equally beyond the ruler's control, the *qāḍīs* continued to rely upon the ruler for execution of their judgments. Moreover, the *qāḍīs* themselves continued to be appointed, paid, and dismissed by the ruler; and the latter retained his power to limit the competence of the *qāḍīs'* jurisdiction in time, place, and subject matter. Despite their Islamic propaganda, the ᶜAbbāsid rulers were not long content to suffer the existence of so important an institution independent of their authority; and they used the various powers confirmed to them by the Sharīᶜah to cut down the role of the *qāḍīs*. If they could not control the Law, they could at least fence in its judges.

The restrictions imposed upon the Sharīᶜah in action, however, were not solely due to the despotic tendencies of the ᶜAbbāsid rulers or of their successors since then. In some ways, the Sharīᶜah was self-limiting. It bound the *qāḍī* in terms of procedure as well as of law, with the result that *qāḍī* justice became more cumbersome and was deprived of all initiative. One quick result of the latter fact was that competence in matters of crime was mostly taken away from the *qāḍī* and given to the police (*shurṭah*), another arm of the administration. Similarly, utilizing the earlier Sassanid institution, the ᶜAbbāsid caliphs re-established administrative tribunals to hear complaints (*maẓālim*) about miscarriages of *qāḍī* justice and the oppressions of powerful men. Very soon, this "King's justice" was competing with the *qāḍī* courts, notably in matters of property right; and they thus constituted a further limitation of the *qāḍī's* function.

Nevertheless, it remains true that the *qāḍī* institution is one of the most vigorous ever developed by Muslim society. Although in most Muslim countries the *qāḍī's* jurisdiction and power have progressively been narrowed to the point that only matters of family law remain in his hands, the *qāḍī* courts are still an important part of their legal systems. In Saudi Arabia, the Sharīᶜah is still the only official law and the *qāḍī* courts are still the only official courts, although it is interesting to note the recent formation in that country of a board of complaints

reminiscent of the ᶜAbbāsid prototype. In Turkey on the other hand, and recently in Egypt, the *qāḍī* courts have been abolished.

THE CLASSICAL THEORY

Meanwhile, to go back to the formative period of Islam, the bands of pious scholars at work in the various cities of the empire had become schools of law, each with a body of tradition representing the particular synthesis of Islamic precept and local practice established by the consensus of the local scholars, each school differing somewhat from its neighbors but in touch with them and influenced by them, each continuing to elaborate its doctrines in the context of early ᶜAbbāsid society.

In this process, the more or less anonymous "living tradition" of the local schools came more and more to be vested in bodies of doctrine and opinion recorded and extended by "masters" of the schools and their disciples; and the schools thus gradually lost their geographical identity and became distinct in terms of doctrine instead, each school under the name of an early master. In this way the schools of lower Iraq bit by bit developed into the Ḥanafī school, after the legal scholar Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767); and the schools of the Ḥijāz became the Mālikī school after their eminent jurist, Mālik ibn Anas (d. 179/795). Of several such schools, only these two together with the Shāfiᶜī and Ḥanbalī schools, all equally orthodox, have survived into modern times.

By the end of the 2nd century of Islam, about the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd and Charlemagne, this process of "personalization" was well begun. The Sharīᶜah itself had been developed in general outline and fixed in a body of jurisprudence; and it had, so to speak, become self-conscious. It had begun to seek an explanation of itself.

The formal theory of the origins of the Sharīᶜah as elaborated during the 3rd century of Islam has not much connection with historical reality. It is rather an explanation of the law and its sources developed long after the law itself had come into being, and it was the work of scholars mostly ignorant of that historical process. It was essentially a *post factum* attempt to find a solid Islamic explanation and basis for the body of Islamic law already in existence.

According to the classical theory, there are four sources (*uṣūl*) of Sacred Law: the Qurᵓān; the Sunnah, or the example set for Muslims in word and deed by the Prophet; *Ijmāᶜ*, or the consensus of the legal scholars on points of law; and *Qiyās*, or analogy, a logical method of extending known law to new situations.

Of some 6000-odd verses in the Qurᵓān, only about 600 supply rulings which fall within the circle of law — law in its wide Muslim sense. These verses deal chiefly with exhortations and rules about warfare and the taking of booty, about marriage, divorce, and inheritance. They prescribe a *lex talionis*, and lay down penalties for certain delicts such as theft, fornication and slander. They urge decent treat-

ment of orphans, the honoring of contracts, and fairness towards one's wives — typical of the normative reformative character of the Qurʾān and of Muslim law itself.

The legal verses of the Qurʾān are a miscellany of isolated fragments consisting of warnings against and appeals to change certain details of the unwritten customary law and practice of the primitive Arab community in which Muḥammad lived. In no sense do they constitute a system or framework of a body of law, even in barest outline.

And yet the Qurʾān claims to be a universal explanation of this world and the next. "Man is not left bewildered," it says. A solution of the apparent contradiction between the incomplete and haphazard rules of the Qurʾān and its claim to universality was found in the repeated Quranic injunction to obey the Prophet. This injunction came to be interpreted to mean that the example of the Prophet (divinely guided as he was thought to be) carried the force of law.

The Sunnah, or the practice of the Prophet, is embodied in thousands of stories and annecdotes about him. Each story or tradition (ḥadīth) comes equipped with an *isnād,* or a list of transmitters — A said that B told him that C heard from D that E witnessed the Prophet doing this or saying that. The authenticity of these traditions was established by a formal examination of the chain of transmitters and not by application of historical criticism or even common sense to the content of the traditions. Modern western scholarship has established the fact that most of the traditions, while purporting to record legal precedents set by the Prophet, actually embody the ideas, habits, assumptions, aspirations, and vested interests of later generations. Later generations of scholars, as traditions from the Prophet became increasingly important as a source of law, tended to recreate the Prophet in their own image, putting their own customs and practices under the aegis of an alleged prophetic example in order to sanctify them with the authority of divine precedent.

This general retrojection was not, in the main, deliberate or done in bad faith; mostly, like Topsy, it "just growed!" But in this way, new legal raw material continued to find its way into the Sharīᶜah and the Sharīᶜah was able to keep abreast of changing reality. By the middle of the 3rd century of Islam, however, the Sunni scholars had arrived at a general agreement as to which traditions were valid and which not; and had recognized six collections of traditions as being authoritative. The traditions accepted by the scholars as sound became the second material source of Muslim law, explaining, supplementing, and even correcting the first.

The agreement of the scholars upon a body of approved traditions is an example of the third source of Sacred Law: *Ijmāᶜ*, the consensus of the scholars. *Ijmāᶜ* finds its basis as a source of law in the Sunnah where the Prophet is recorded as saying, "My community will never agree on an error." Which interpretation of a Quranic ruling is correct,

which traditions are authentic and binding, which analogical extensions are valid — questions of this sort were decided by the gradual formation of a consensus among the legal scholars. *Ijmāᶜ*, therefore, is more a principle of selection and ratification than a material source of law.

But it is decisive: because the Qurʾān and the Sunna, legal principles and rules and analogical extensions all depend for their meaning upon what the Muslim scholars agreed was their meaning. The principle of consensus might have provided Muslim law—as indeed it did for a time—with a powerful means of growth and adaptation to changing circumstance. Instead, it became the great obstacle to adaptation and change, a principle of rigidity. A consensus once reached on a given point was considered to be forever binding beyond any chance of reconsideration—a sort of canonical *stare decisis*. Muslim scholars of a later day did not have the power to reopen questions answered by their predecessors; and instead of a flexible instrument of progress, *Ijmāᶜ* became the mighty anchor of the status quo, the status quo of the 10th century A.D.

According to the theory, *Qiyās*, the extension of known law to new situations by analogy, is the fourth source of law. Not a material source like Qurʾān and Sunnah, it is rather a method. Like *Ijmāᶜ*, *Qiyās* derives its sanction from the *Sunna* in traditions to the effect that the Prophet enjoined the use of reason or personal judgment (*raʾy*). One tradition, for example, tells us that when the Prophet sent Abū Mūsā as his governor to Yemen, he said: "Judge by the book of God, and if you do not find in it what you need, by the practice of the Prophet. If you do not find guidance in this, use your own opinion (*raʾy*)." *Qiyās* came to be the disciplined use of personal opinion, the scholars agreeing that reasoned extensions of the Sacred Law must proceed to the new situation from known law by strict analogy based on a legally relevant common denominator or cause (*ᶜillah*). For example, tradition records the Prophet as forbidding drinking from gold and silver vessels. *Qiyās* extends this prohibition to eating from gold and silver plates, the common legal denominator being feeding from gold and silver utensils. Analogical extensions of known law became binding when ratified by the consensus.

The definition of sources and the irrevocability of consensus gradually deprived the body of "positive" Islamic law (*furūᶜ*-"applications," or literally, "branches" as opposed to *uṣūl*, "sources," or literally, "roots") of the possibility of further growth. For as the scholars progressed in their elaboration of the Law, the fact that they could not recognize new sources or turn back to reconsider points already agreed upon meant that before very long the logical possibilities of the legal system were exhausted, and it developed to extremes every bit as absurd and empty as those reached by the scholastics of medieval Europe. But before losing themselves in sterile detail, the scholars had constructed an imposing edifice of law, and one that has stood the

test of time. The Sharīᶜah has endured essentially unchanged for a thousand years.

Its gradual crystallization found a later formulation in the phrase, "the closing of the gate of *ijtihād.*" *Ijtihād* means the exercise of independent mental effort in the search for truth. But as the law became fixed, there was no more room for *ijtihād* and it was gradually replaced by *taqlīd,* the duty to accept without question the conclusions worked out in the past and ratified by the slow movement of consensus. And so during the 4th Muslim century, the "gate" closed. Henceforth the work of the scholars was limited to explanation, interpretation, and application.

In theory, the Sharīᶜah is the all-sufficient regulator of the whole range of human action, including conduct of state. For ruler and subjects alike, it marks the "pathway" (which is the root meaning of Sharīᶜah) to salvation. The ruler, or imām, according to the theory, derives his authority from God and upon him as God's vicegerent lies the duty of guaranteeing observance of the Sacred Law in the Muslim community. Upon the community in turn lies the duty of obedience. The ruler represents the Law, but he does not embody it since the Law exists independently of him and he is himself subject to it. His transgressions of the Law in his acts of state as well as in his private acts are sanctioned by the promise of retribution in the Hereafter.

It is here that a fundamental shortcoming becomes apparent. In theory, the Sharīᶜah purports to impose a thoroughgoing rule of law binding on ruler and ruled alike. In practice, as we have seen, it failed to establish effective control over the ruler. And so far from imposing on the community the civic responsibility of restraining or removing a Law-violating ruler, the doctors of the Law (for historical reasons which it is not necessary to go into) instead enjoined obedience on the grounds that civil disturbance was worse than "obedience in sin," and that "the tyrannous ruler is a thousand times better than chaos." Muslim society thus fatalistically disclaimed responsibility for government and failed to establish in the name of the Sharīᶜah an airtight guarantee of individual and community rights against arbitrary authority. Instead of "rule of law", "oriental despotism" became the keynote of Islamic history.

If it is true that Muslim society as a whole was law-abiding, and also true that the Sharīᶜah generally imposed a restraint upon the ruler through his own piety or through his political prudence during an era when the *qāḍīs* and jurisconsults wielded an enormous popular prestige; and if it is therefore possible to assert that there was a qualified rule of law during most of Islamic history, it nonetheless remains a fact that Muslim society brings little sense of responsibility for government to its present day problems, and no ingrained habit of forcing rulers to behave or of bringing them to book for their wrongs.

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST

With this background in mind, we may now glance at the changes produced during the past century or so by the so-called "impact of the West." The term has become a cliché, but it stand as an accurate description of the rising tide of goods, tools, techniques, social institutions, ideas, and values from the West that has inundated the Middle East along with other areas of the world. Faced with the evident inferiority—often emphasized by military force— of its own cultural equipment in the face of this onslaught, Middle Eastern society has been quick to seize upon and utilize all these things in its effort to overcome its disadvantage and to acquire respectability in terms of the new western model. In a Toynbeean sense, this is the Herodian response to the challenge of the West; and the great new reformist and reconstructive social force in the Middle East is nationalism, with the nationalists (whose basically constructive purposes become destructive and extremist when too long thwarted) as the "creative minority."

The result has been a profound and accelerating social transformation in the Middle East, and nowhere have the changes been more drastic than in the field of law. Modern nation states with their separate constitutions and governments have risen from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. National sovereignty has replaced the multinational religious doctrine of the Caliphate. Western-type codes, courts, and legislation have dispossessed the religious courts and all but deprived the Sharīᶜah of social effect in Turkey and Egypt, and elsewhere have thrust them far into the background. Even in an isolated and "backward" country like Saudi Arabia, the new complaints board and other administrative "committees" suggest that developments paralled to those in the other countries are to be expected there before long.

On the face of it, the Sharīᶜah has been a major victim of western legal concepts and methods; but this deserves a closer look. If one considers all the law actually applied in a modern Muslim state as a circle or pie-chart, one can think of it as being divided into sectors. One sector would consist of secular municipal law, the positive law of the state (or *siyāsah* in the terminology of Muslim law). A second sector would be that part of the Sharīᶜah still applied in practice (dealing typically with matters properly religious or akin to the religious such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, pious endowments, etc.), leaving the rest of the circle to customary law. The size of the Muslim law sector has varied with time and place, impinged upon as we have seen by the police, complaints, or marketplace jurisdictions set up by a given ruler. But in recent decades it has been far more drastically constricted by the expansion of the municipal law sector through executive decrees and legislated codes and statutes. For the first time, the Sharīᶜah has been in competition with a rival system of law. The constricting tendency was carried to its logical conclusion in Turkey in

the 1920's during the secular revolution under Ataturk, and also recently in Egypt where abolition of the religious law courts meant the banishment of the Sharīᶜah in its entirety to the realm of religious ideal.

The ruling authority's power to do this, however, is conceded by the Sharīᶜah itself through its acknowledgment of the ruler's right to limit the jurisdiction of the *qāḍī*; and while they may deplore it, the conservative scholars of the law (*ᶜulamāᵓ*) undoubtedly prefer straightforward suspension, which leaves the Sacred Law intact as an ideal, to attempts to change the Law itself.

Others, however, both within and outside the ranks of the *ᶜulamāᵓ* want to do precisely that. They want to establish (or as they say, reestablish) a thoroughgoing Sharīᶜah rule of law. They begin with the premise that the Sacred Law is valid universally, for all time, and for all the activities of man. Noting that the law seems no longer adequate to the needs of modern society, they conclude that its original and essential principles have been obscured by the later additions of the scholars. They therefore call for a return to the "true" principles of Islam, and assert the right to reopen the "gate of *ijtihād.*" This implies a loosening of the principle of *Ijmāᶜ*, and appears to threaten the whole edifice of the Sharīᶜah. Of this the conservative theologians are acutely aware, and they charge the modernizers with seeking to destroy the religion.

The modernizing approach—until it was displaced by the more self-confident and forthright approach of President ᶜAbd-al-Nāsir's government—is visible in recent Egyptian legislation. Instead of eliminating Sharīᶜah jurisdiction by frontal assault, so to speak, and substituting a more desirable law, the Sharīᶜah jurisdiction was maintained but the Sharīᶜah itself was infiltrated and made to conform more closely to modern need. The method used was to abrogate by legislative enactment the *qāḍī*'s right to apply a given rule of the Sharīᶜah and to require him to apply another more suitable rule resurrected from the past and representing an aberrant opinion long ago discarded by *Ijmāᶜ*. For example, Article 4 of Décret-Loi 25 of 1929 modified the Muslim law rule then in force that ambiguous expressions which may signify divorce do so signify. Ambiguity was to be resolved in favor of divorce. The amending Article 4 stated: "Expressions of ambiguous meaning which may at the same time signify divorce and something else do not signify divorce unless intent to divorce exists." The change was based on the view to this effect held by two early jurists; and upon their authority, the change was held to be a valid restatement of the Sharīᶜah.

Between the extremes of abrogation and infiltration, the 19th century Ottoman *Majalla,* or "Digest of Just Laws," and the codes of Qadry Pasha in Egypt form a sort of halfway house. The former was an approach to a civil code based on the Ḥanafī (which school enjoyed official favor in the Ottoman Empire) law of contracts, obligations,

and civil procedure; and the latter were unofficial codifications of Ḥanafī family law and the laws of inheritance, property, and pious foundations. These codes were western in form and Muslim in content, and represent an initial response to contact with western legal ideas. The *Majalla,* promulgated during the years 1869-76, was never applied in Egypt (which already had its own legal system) and has since been superseded in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. In Jordan, however, parts of it are still applied.

These early codifications have present day successors in the form of the closely similar civil codes of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. All are of recent adoption, and owe paternity to Egypt's eminent jurist, Dr. Sanḥūry. They are based on western principles of legislation, and draw both on the "sound" provisions of the Sharīᶜah and on non-Sharīᶜah sources including the jurisprudence of the national courts and foreign law codes. The Sanḥūry compromise thus satisfies the needs of modern society and at the same time usefully preserves something of the substance of Muslim law.

All these approaches to the problem of ancient law and modern need reveal the profound shift in assumptions that the impact of the West has produced in Muslim society. In the past, the ruler and all of society were regarded as operating within the framework of the unchanging Sacred Law. Now, they have moved outside and have no doubt about their competence and title to write their own sovereign law to meet changing necessity. Nowhere is this change of viewpoint more strikingly evident than among precisely those modernizing theologians who call for the reimposition *in toto* of a reformed Sharīᶜah. They no longer seek, as their ancient predecessors did, to learn the will of God as a guidance for man. In going back into the past in search of more suitable precepts, they already know what they are looking for. The need of modern society is the platform on which they stand. The Law is to be redefined in terms of social welfare: "...the goal of the Law is only the welfare of men, and wheresoever lies the welfare of men, there is the Law of God," writes Shaikh Khallāf of Al-Azhar in a recent treatise. In their reworking of the classical theory, public welfare (*maṣlaḥah*) becomes the great new source of law by giving Islamic approval to the positive law of the state (*siyāsah*) by which it is served, insofar as the latter is *siyāsah sharᶜīyah* and does not violate any of the basic principles (as newly defined) of the religion.

Viewed in historical perspective, this may be taken as merely the latest phase in the long effort of Muslim theologians to find a satisfactory Islamic explanation for the changing realities of political rule and to cast the net of Islamic control over the ruler. Through their attempt to sanctify *raison d'état,* as it were, they may now succeed. But it seems clear that in the process Islam and its Sacred Law will have been altered, secularized, and weakened even as an ideal.

By thrusting the Sharīᶜah far into the background, the influence of secular conceptions from the West has mostly dissolved the qualified rule of law imposed during the centuries of classical Islam. Never fully controlled, the ruler now appears to be fully uncontrolled from a Sharīᶜah point of view. It remains to ask whether the modern Islamic states of the Middle East by establishing constitutions and bills of rights based on western models have been able to establish in fact the substitute rule of law thus implied. Few western observers and few politically conscious Middle Easterners would concede that they have, or that it is even possible to do so without educated populations prepared to insist upon it.

One may note, however, the interesting attempt of the Egyptian Council of State under the presidency of Dr. Sanḥūry to impose judicial review on the administrative acts of the State, and indeed upon the legislative acts of Parliament. The Revolution of 1952, however, and the suspension of constitutional rule intervened before any practical results could be observed.

It is not, it would seem, necessary to take too pessimistic a view of the present lack of a rule of law in the Middle East. Education is being extended with very great rapidity in the area, and with it goes the penetration of modern ideas and aspirations. If constitutions and bills of rights so far amount only to a sort of lip service to a popular ideal, at least the ideal is newly there, and popular. Implementation may come in time.

American Universities, Field Staff RICHARD H. NOLTE
New York N.Y.

THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN AL-GHAZĀLĪ AND THE PHILOSOPHERS ON THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD

PART II

The philosophers' third and fourth proofs of the eternity of the world are both based on the concept of possibility.

In the *third proof* [1] the argument turns around the possibility of the world as a whole. It can be stated very briefly, as follows:

Everyone must admit that at least the possibility of the world's existence is eternal; for it could never have been impossible and then become possible. But what can possibly exist eternally must actually do so, because, as Ibn Rushd puts it, "what can receive eternity cannot become corruptible" [2], i.e. have a beginning or ending.

It is not clear how this conclusion follows, until we see that the argument rests on a hidden assumption, pointed out by Van den Bergh [3] that the world as a whole is ungenerated. Now everything ungenerated is eternal, because by definition it could never have come into existence or been corrupted. In this case it can be argued: the world is certainly possible. It has also existed actually at *some* time. But if it existed at any time, it must have done so at every time, since it is not subject to generation or decay (*al-kaun wa-l-fasād*).

The assumption made, that the world *is* ungenerated, begs the whole question at issue, as Van den Bergh has shown. If we substitute "Socrates" for "the world" we can start off with the premise: "the possibility of Socrates' existence is eternal." But it is obvious that we cannot prove from this that Socrates is actually eternal.

Al-Ghazālī makes this objection, saying quite correctly that eternal possibility does not imply eternal actuality, "for reality does not conform to possibility but differs from it." [4] He does not see the hidden assumption, that the world as a whole is something ungenerated. Even if he had seen it, he would not have accepted it as a proved fact.

The *fourth proof* [5] concerns the relation of possibility to matter, inside the world. The philosophers' argument can be stated as follows. While the world as a whole is ungenerated and uncorrupted, the world in detail is continually changing. Change means the combination of fresh forms in matter, making new things actual. Now every new combination was eternally possible. But possibility requires a substratum, matter, in which the changes of form take place. Therefore this substratum, matter, must also be eternal.

This is the essence of the philosophers' argument. Here a criticism may be offered, which does not occur in Al-Ghazālī. It seems to me

[1] *TF*, pp. 66-68; *TT*, pp. 97-99.
[2] *TT*, pp. 97-98.
[3] 57.1.
[4] *TF*, pp. 67-68.
[5] *TF*, pp. 68-78; *TT*, pp. 100-17.

that the philosophers, including Ibn Rushd, confuse logical possibility with potentiality. Then they compose an argument by selecting the most favorable feature of each of the two concepts, as follows: every possibility is eternal; matter is implied by every potentiality; therefore matter is eternal.

In the syllogism, stated thus, it is obvious that the supposed middle term is ambiguous, that is to say there is no real middle term. If we take each of the two concepts and apply it exclusively in the syllogism, we can see that it does not lead to the desired conclusion.

First, let us take possibility in its correct logical sense. We say that any state of affairs is possible if its existence is not logically impossible owing to self-contradiction or some other logical absurdity. In this sense, the major premise is correct, for the existence of each changing thing in the world was always a possibility. But no substratum of actual matter is implied by this logical possibility. Therefore, the eternity of matter does not follow.

Now consider the other alternative, potentiality. Here the minor premise is correct, that matter is implied by every potentiality; for in the Aristotelian system potentialities belong to actually existing matter. This boy has the potentiality of becoming a man, but not that of becoming a snake. In the same way everything has its fixed and limited potentialities, according to the nature of its species. What the potentialities of each thing are can only be discovered by empirical observation of the development of real things. So potentialities are a kind of attribute, which can only be spoken of in connection with real things. Their existence implies the existence of some matter, in the sense that they only exist where matter exists. But if we turn to the major premise and say "Every *potentiality* is eternal," we can now see that there is no justification for such an assertion. Indeed potentialities are peculiarly temporal, for they belong to instances of species only at a particular stage of development. Therefore once more there is no proof of the eternity of matter.

Al-Ghazālī does not see this ambiguity in the philosophers' argument, nor does Ibn Rushd. Their discussion revolves around logical possibility only, and deals with the ontological status of possibility. Is it subjective or objective? This is a very difficult question. The discussion of it in *Tahāfut* has great intrinsic interest, but no relevance to the question about the world. For even if we accept the philosophers' view, that possibility has some kind of objective existence as an object of knowledge, still this would prove nothing about the *actual* existence of the world, which is the point at issue.

Our conclusion from the two arguments from possibility must be that nothing can be proved about the actual from the possible. This is inevitable because the nature of the actual can only be known from evidence, and the possible provides no evidence. The logically possible always offers at least two alternatives, for if "A is B" is possible, "A

is not B" must also be possible; but logic provides no way of choosing between them and deciding which is true. Such a decision can only come from actuality, by observation and inference. In the issue before us, both an eternal world and a finite world are possible; therefore no amount of reflection about possibility will tell us which is actual.

From this survey the four proofs of the first discussion of the *Tahāfuts,* our conclusion is that in none of them have the philosophers made out their case for the eternity of the world. This is partly, no doubt, due to the superior skill and clarity of Al-Ghazālī, and the somewhat disappointing performance of Ibn Rushd in this debate. But there is a more essential reason, connected with the methods of the two parties (the philosophers and Al-Ghazālī). We now examine their theories of knowledge and their methods of aiming at the truth about such questions as the origin of the world. We shall confine ourselves first to discussing their rational methods, and then mention their views on revelation at the end.

For the philosophers, the truth about the world can be deduced by demonstrative arguments (syllogisms) which make use of sound premises. And the premises can be known in two ways: by observation of the world, which gives us empirical knowledge, and by intellectual apprehension of primary axioms, which gives us intuitive knowledge. Examples of such axioms, in the Aristotelian tradition, are: every event must have a cause; causes produce their effects necessarily; the cause cannot be identical with that part of the object which is moved or affected.

These axioms are not analytic statements, known to be true by mere analysis of language. But they are thought of as no less ultimate truths, which cannot be proved or disproved by further argument. The test of their certainty is that all men of sufficient understanding and education admit them, just as anyone with these qualities admits mathematical truths. Consequently, if we accept the axioms of the Aristotelian system, together with its empirical knowledge or beliefs, we should be able to work out for ourselves the very same conclusions about the world — provided there are no fallacies in the reasoning on either side.

The philosophers do not admit imagination as a source of truth. A good imagination is a great help to a man, in enabling his intellect to grasp quickly the relevant connections between facts and "see the middle term." But the imagination of objects or of relations between them is in itself no guarantee of the reality of the objects or the relations.

When we come to Al-Ghazālī, we have to get rid of a false impression which has become traditional concerning his attitude to reason. This is the idea that Al-Ghazālī mistrusted reason. Such an idea can only lead to confusion about him, for one may ask: "What was he doing in his *Tahāfut*?" To say that he was carrying on an activity which he rejected later, when he became a Ṣūfī, will only land us in

worse confusion when we read his later books, for many of them are just as much works or reason as *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah.* His whole view of reason can only be learned from a careful study of his biography and doctrines. Much could be said on this subject, but here comment will be confined to his *Tahāfut.*

The fact is that Al-Ghazālī accepts in principle all the rational sources of knowledge accepted by the philosophers: observation, axioms and reasoning. He also rejects imagination, emphatically. The difference between him and the philosophers, in the sphere of rational knowledge, is that he rejects much of their particular reasoning as fallacious or contradictory, and some of their most important axioms as not known by any intuition. Their faulty reasoning might no doubt be regarded as remediable. But the weakness of their axioms is more serious; it leads him to conclude that the philosophers' positions on the origin of the world, and other questions, cannot be proved by direct rational methods. Reason is valid as far as it goes, but it does not cover as much ground as the philosophers think.

The disagreement of method, therefore, between the philosophers and Al-Ghazālī resolves itself in the main in to this: that the philosophers place more reliance on intuition and so accept a greater number of axioms of reason. What happens when they assert that something is known by intuition and Al-Ghazālī denies it? An example occurs in *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* pp. 29-30. The philosophers have asserted that it is impossible to see in an eternal Will (of God) a cause producing the world in time, after a delay and not from eternity. Al-Ghazālī answers, on behalf of the Ashᶜarites, that such an assertion of impossibility must either be proved by argument or known by intuition, by a direct necessity of thought. If it is proved, the philosophers should bring forth their argument. If it is known by intuition, why do their opponents the Ashᶜarites not share this intuition? Ibn Rushd believes that the assertion in question is derived from the axiom "Effect follows cause immediately," and he answers Al-Ghazālī's methodological objection by saying: "It is not a condition of objective truth that it should be known to all." [6] But this as it stands is an unsatisfactory answer. For, as Van den Bergh points out, [7] to Aristotelians the test of the objective truth of first principles is their universal acknowledgement. Perhaps Ibn Rushd is thinking of the well-known qualifications of the principle of universal acknowledgement: that the judge of philosophical truth must have natural intelligence and an intellectual education. Elsewhere he says that when someone denies a truth that is certain and evident, it must be because he is unintelligent or uneducated. [8] But the answer is still unsatisfactory; for a man like Al-Ghazālī himself, for instance, had all the required qualities and could understand

---

[6] *TT,* p. 13.
[7] 7.1.
[8] *TT,* pp. 29-30.

the philosophers' assertion perfectly well; but he could still reject it.

The fact is that when such a conflict arises about a supposed intuition, it is no use saying dogmatically: "My intuition is sound and yours is unsound," or "I am qualified to understand and you are not." We should be able to obtain agreement from every reasonable judge. If we cannot, then it is well to look at the supposed intuition again more closely and ask whether it really is one.

In modern times we have learnt to do this more and more, under the influence of Hume and Kant in particular. Hume showed that every sensible statement can only be justified as true in one of two ways: either we know it analytically, by simply understanding the meaning of our language, as in definitions; or it must be justified ultimately by some empirical observation. Thus we can learn nothing about the real world by supposed axioms of reason. For instance, if someone asserts: "Every effect follows its cause by a logical necessity," we must ask: "How do you know that?" If he answers: "I know it because it is implied in the notions of cause and effect as I understand them," we must tell him: "You may understand concepts as you like, but you cannot show that this kind of cause and effect exists in the real world, for you cannot point out one 'necessary connection' between observed events." Necessary connections exist primarily between statements or propositions, when one logically implies another. We can say loosely that an event implies another, but it can do so only in combination with a natural law, and all laws are known only empirically, not as logically necessary. Kant did not accept Hume's sweeping theory entirely, but he was aware of the difficulty posed by synthetic statements about the world which appear to be known only *à priori*, not by any empirical evidence. In the case of assertions about the origin of the world, he showed in the "Antinomies of pure reason" that opposite assertions can appear equally convincing if we follow the old dogmatic methods of starting from supposed axioms of reason; and he gave the arguments on both sides, "proving" both the eternity of the world and its beginning in finite time. [9]

The conclusion we have to draw about the world is then as follows. Let us take the statement "The world is eternal." The writer does not question that this statement has a meaning, as some people would (the logical positivists). It it taken here as meaningful, also as synthetic: i.e. "eternal" is an attribute not contained in the concept of "world." I then say to myself: the opposite statement, "The world had a beginning in time, at a finite interval from the present," is equally meaningful (and synthetic). I can conceive either statement as being true. How then am I to decide which is really true? I have absolutely no empirical evidence, since prehistory, geology and astronomy do not take us back to a known beginning of all things. The arguments which employ

[9] The first antinomy, in *Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd ed., pp. 454-61.

axioms of reason are also worthless, because when we examine the axioms we find that they are either (a) analytic statements giving us no knowledge about the empirical world, or (b) synthetic statements about the world which have to support from empirical observation, the only kind of support that can justify such statements. Any claim that such axioms are known by intuition simply breaks down when someone denies the intuition, and claims the opposite assertion as conceivable and possibly true. Thus we lack any rational way of finding out whether the world is eternal or of finite duration, though it must in fact be one or the other.

Coming back now to the Islamic philosophers and Al-Ghazālī, we can see that the former followed the somewhat dogmatic tradition of Aristotelian philosophy — dogmatic at least in the sense mentioned, of acceptance of a number of axioms of reason over and above the principles of logic. We have seen how each of the four proofs contains at least one such axiom as an essential part of its argument. In the first proof, there is the principle of determination of all wills by knowledge of the good (the principle of "sufficient reason"), also that of immediate action of all causes. In the second there is the principle that time implies actual movement. In the third, there is the concealed assumption that the world as a whole must be ungenerated. And in the fourth, there is the confused assertion that possibility requires a substratum of matter. Thus the philosophers were vulnerable to the kind of attack made by empiricists: How do you know this? What can you say to people who claim an opposite intuition? We have seen Al-Ghazālī making just this kind of attack. He did so not because he denied the possibility of axioms of reason — he did not draw the full conclusions of post-Humean empirical philosophy. But he was freer than the philosophers to deny particular axioms, because he was not bound to Aristotelianism, emotionally or by education. Thus it seems clear, to the writer at least, that Al-Ghazālī's position was stronger on grounds of method.

It now remains to outline in a summary fashion the attitudes of the parties towards revelation, in order to complete the picture of the sources of truth.

For the Islamic philosopher, Scripture is of course a source of truth and not of falsehood. Everything in it is true, when it is correctly interpreted, and the major truths about the world are all contained in the Qurʾān or Traditions in one place or another. But all these truths can also be known independently by the rational methods described above, and these methods also produce them in a direct and scientific form, and no doubt with more detail. In Scripture the literal meaning often conceals the scientific truth from the masses. This is the position of Ibn Rushd, at least about theoretical science, with which we are now concerned.

For Al-Ghazālī, Scripture holds a more essential place as a source

of truth. Rational sources leave large gaps in our knowledge of the world, and some of these gaps are filled by revelation, the Qurʾān and Traditions. They tell us truths about the world that we could never have dicovered for ourselves, e.g. that the world was created by God at a past time, a finite number of years ago. And it is not an irrational act of faith to accept Scripture as a sound source of knowledge: there are rational grounds for believing that the Qurʾān, in particular, is a divine revelation and therefore true. It is therefore rational to accept the individual statements of the Qurʾān on the basis of our confidence in the whole, just as a child who trusts his parents believes that their orders are right even when he does not see their justification for a particular order.

A third position is possible, that of some modern empiricists who hold that neither axioms of reason nor Scripture are valid sources of truth, at least about such questions as the origin of the world. According to this view there is no way at all of knowing the answer to the question we have been discussing. We have seen that there is common ground between Al-Ghazālī's position and such modern empiricism, but their final conclusions about the world are widely divergent because of their different views of revelation. But perhaps there are other empiricists who also accept revelation, and thus come closer to Al-Ghazālī's position.

Behind the attitudes of the Islamic philosophers and Al-Ghazālī there are different emotional attachments: of the philosophers to Aristotle and the rest of their philosophic heritage; of Al-Ghazālī to the Scriptures of Islam and the traditions of Islamic learning. These attachments provide much of the background which helps us to understand why they held to their philosophic positions. But this is not the place to enter into psychological history. Ostensibly the debate in the *Tahāfuts* is conducted by direct arguments without reference to Aristotle or revelation as commanding authorities. This is possible because the philosophers think they can prove their theses by reason, and Al-Ghazālī thinks he can undermine them by reason alone without reference to Scripture.

University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Michigan

George F. Hourani

GLIMPSES OF TURKISH OPINION

Below are a few representative translations from Turkish periodicals read over the last six months, followed by a few tentative deductions and questions arising from their subject matter.

The first contain material representing Islam as a religion. For the last six months, the Istanbul Daily, *Yeni Sabah,* has been running in daily instalments a highly imaginative and idealised life of Muḥammad. All through Ramaḍān the same paper devoted a quarter page every day to religious instruction, headed: *Corner for Ramaḍān.* This consisted of a column of "Inspiration from the Qur'ān," i.e. orthodox teaching on a chosen Quranic text or a dissertation on a duty such as fasting, two short stories, a short biography of a prominent Muslim personality, and a list of the preachers at the leading mosques for the current day.

The following four translations are from *Corner for Ramaḍān.*

"Once upon a time, no rain fell upon a village for many months. The crops did not ripen, the valleys dried up, famine threatened. One day, the inhabitants began to pray. Thousands lifted open hands towards Heaven, directed their hearts towards God. But it was all of no avail, not a tiny cloud appeared in the sky. The people, weary and disheartened, returned to their homes. One from amongst them, however, feeling very sad, threw himself down in the shade of a tree. Then he saw a man of sick appearance, thin as a shadow, raising his arms to Heaven; a few minutes later the sun-drenched ground was darkened and merciful drops of rain began to fall. The watcher was very much intrigued and moved and followed the mysterious stranger. Upon discovering that he was a servant [1] in a household he bought him from his master. The servant attached himself loyally to his new master, doing what he was told and evading what his master did not wish. This servant was such, however, that although he belonged to one man he was the servant of all and loved everyone. The master was pleased with him but often thought about the day the rain had fallen. Why had Al-Hakk refused the prayers of a great multitude and accepted this man's prayer? At last he could keep silent no longer but asked the servant for an explanation. The servant said:

'I said to Al-Hakk: Lord! In the name of Thy love for me and my love for Thee, let Thy mercy fall upon this village.'

Then he entered into his room and threw himself upon the carpet, saying:

'O God! They want to learn Thy secrets from me. Silence me!'

Then he gave up his spirit to his Beloved, and left this world."

"One Ramaḍān, in summer, a Bektaşi was fasting. But at mid-day, he felt so stupified under the burning noonday sun that he was forced

[1] The word here is *Kul* literally: a slave.

to hasten to a fountain and to place his lips under the tap. Drop by drop, he drank of the refreshing water. At that moment, a religious student appeared at his side. He cried out:

'What have you done, Oh Father Dervish? It is Ramaḍān! You have broken the fast.' The Bektaşi took a long breath and answered: 'Ramaḍān comes round every year. But I come to this world only once. When the Saint leaves, he does not return!' "

"The ruler Sultan Selim was amongst those who greatly admired the Mevlevi poet, Sheikh Galib. Once, when visiting him, he came to the Mevlevihane at Galata where the customary dancing and music [1] were taking place. Selim III was a great lover of Turkish music and was a man strong in faith and love.

After the dancing was over, he went with Galib Dede to the latter's cell and they were soon deep in conversation. Another day, the young ruler was so bewitched and so moved by the music and the spectacle of the dancing that he laid his head down on the lap of Galib Dede and closed his eyes.

'Dede,' he said, 'Tell me something about Hazret Mevlana. Tell me about one of his miracles.' Galib Dede smiled. Then he replied: 'There is no finer miracle than this. You are the monarch, Selim III. I am the poor Mevlevi Dede, the dervish Galib. Yet you, my monarch, are resting on my knee.' "

"God divides into four degrees those who obey Him.

1. The prophets (*nebiler*); those who reach a standard of perfection as regards both knowledge and deeds.
2. The faithful or chosen ones (*siddiqlar*); those who, through purification and abstinence, through the use of holy sentences and the exaltation of miracles, through familiarity with mystical knowledge, are chosen by God.
3. The martyrs (*şehitler*); those who sacrifice their lives on behalf of Islam. They are the happy ones.
4. The people of righteousness, the slaves (*salah ehli kullar*); those who spend their lives in the obedience of God, who dispose of their worldly goods in accordance with His will."

It is difficult to find anything which might be said to deal constructively with religious reform. Perhaps the following article from *Cumhuriyet* is the nearest approach. It is headed *The English People and Religion,* and was inspired, according to the writer *Cahid Tanyol,* by a visit to England in the course of which he visited Westminster Abbey. A summary here precedes a few quotations.

The English have assimilated Christianity and co-ordinated it with their racial characteristics which have come to them from their very mixed racial heritage. They have been able to co-ordinate various types of religious experience. This is very thought-provoking. Islam in Tur-

---

[1] *Temaşa* = lit.: spectacle.

key has not been able to do this. Orthodoxy and mysticism are mutually opposed in beliefs and practices, yet both influence the people, producing an entirely unco-ordinated religious consciousness. The problem in Turkey is the relation between religious 'emotion' (the Dervish influence) and religious 'intellect' (Orthodoxy). It is important that religious leaders should be trained who can interpret to the people the intellectual and emotional forms of religion.

"(In Ottoman days) the Orthodox theologians and the Dervish saints both wielded great influence not only over the people but over the State. It is enough to point to the contradictions between the love of the Anatolian people for Yunus Emre, their attribution to him of almost divine qualities, and the religious teaching which they received from the theologians. This is certain, the Islam of our people has both an intellectual and an emotional content which they themselves have moulded. When the religious thinking and the religious feelings of the religious man are reconciled, there will no longer be reactionary attitudes on the one hand and religious exploitation on the other ...

... It is not enough to consider the European civilisation. We must consider the attitude of the Turkish people vis-à-vis Islam. In our country, about a century ago, the question of the relationship of religion to the State, to the people, to law, to culture, engrossed our minds. But today, this subject is not brought to the light. Whatever the reason may be for this, the subject will have to be thought out when our relations with the civilisation of the Christian West are under discussion. Truly, this question should be thoroughly studied even before we approach the question of the relations between the two civilisations. It will be seen that the conflict exists within our social structure. At one time the *medrese,* the dervish *tekke,* the religious law (Sharīʿah) and the dervish order, existed contemporaneously in a state of mutual conflict. This has a social meaning. It means that the type of man turned out by the Schools of Orthodox Theology did not meet the religious needs of the people. Now, the English people have created a harmony between religious feeling and religious thinking which they have introduced as a constituent part of their social structure. In that free country which has been able to discuss and weigh religious thought and beliefs, there is no place for excess of religious emotion. With us in Turkey, however, the problem of religious extremism and exploitation is the problem of religious feeling itself."

There is plenty of criticism in the Turkish journals studied. The following is an example of an article which follows a familiar pattern. It is from the fortnightly magazine *Forum* (May 15th.)

"Turkey is a country which, for centuries, has suffered from neglect, and which for many reasons and in many spheres has remained backward. Now, forty years ago a great and heroic saviour (i.e. Atatürk) arose in this country who cleansed it from its enemies and won the esteem of the whole world. This keen and progressive mind believed

that Turkey could be saved, lifted up, and its face turned to the West without appropriating western civilisation, that it was possible to become westernised and to reach such standards without adopting the West in outward form but by taking of its spirit and mind. The basic need then was to introduce laicism, to save the country from the hands of religious 'merchants', to open schools of a western type, to separate religious affairs from those of the world, to allow freedom of conscience.

"All this, because the primary reason for our backwardness as a nation is the fatalism of Islam. Long years ago, the westerner adopted Determinism; he believed that everything has a cause. He strove to analyse, to experiment ..... Out of this was born the technical superiority of the West. On the other hand, Islamic mysticism has been, for long years, far from any kind of scientific thinking. Like a cancer, it has corroded the backward multitudes of the people. 'It is written that everything is written on a man's forehead at birth.' It follows that all that happens is due to a power called Fate or God. Go to the villages, go to the backward areas, you will see that the people still live in this stultifying belief. These feelings of blind faith amongst the people are so deep-seated that it is not easy to dislodge them."

Then follows criticism of the Democratic Party for its concessions in the sphere of religion. The writer continues:

"We believe that Atatürk's revolutionary reforms enabled this country to approach a point where a limit could be set to its misfortunes We shall not return to the old darkness, to the old superstitions. No power can enable us to do this easily, but we must reach the standards of the West as soon as possible, and we must not slow down in our reforming and westernising efforts. As quickly as possible, we must snatch the people from the world of fantasies and superstitions in which they still ignorantly live."

The burning question in contemporary Turkey is the relationship between laicism and religion. It supplies a great deal of material for both articles and correspondence columns. Readers will remember that it is embodied in the Constitution of the State that Turkey is "a nationalist, populist, state-socialist, laic, and revolutionary Republic." The Programme of the People's Republican Party (1935) explains:

"As the conception of religion is a matter of conscience, the Party considers it to be one of the chief factors of the success of our nation in contemporary progress, to separate ideas of religion from politics, and from the affairs of the world and of the State." And again: "The Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions which our nation has made with great sacrifices."

The definitions of these principles must be borne in mind in reading articles, and in assessing any subtle modifications in thinking which may be taking place. The following article is from *Milliyet*, April 10th 1958.

"Our ignorance about one of the foundations (laicism) of the Re-

volution is caused by abuses resulting from the extremist religious and revolutionary ideas about laicism. Both the theologians and the reformers imagine that laicism is irreligious. A rough definition of laicism is that religion and secular affairs are separate from one another. Religion has to do not only with the next life, but with law and morals in this world. The State is not indifferent to religion which establishes the moral foundations of human society. In America, the President does not begin his duties without placing his hand on the Gospel... In France, at Lourdes, prayer accompanies medical treatment. The government assists religious teaching out of its own budget. In Italy, Belgium, Germany, France, there are Christian political parties. In Europe and in America the tombs of saints are open to visits by the public.

Together with the assistance of church organisations, in Europe and in America the laicism which forms part of the national system neither oppresses nor ignores religious life. In Turkey, where the meaning of laicism is always misunderstood, religious life is oppressed at times and ignored at others... The followers of reform and the enemies of reform gnash their teeth at one another, threatening the harmony of society.

Laicism does not mean that religion has no authority over the State, nor that the State has no authority over religion. They depend on mutual regard. Each is bound to support the other. Sometimes it is necessary that they should work together. During the second World War even the Soviet Union had to send priests to the front. There is no success and no victory without religion, but there is no hope of life for those static communities which are void of progressive and reforming effort."

On May 1st, 1958, *Forum* contained a report of a seminar held in the Türk Devrim Oçakları, "in connection with the 30th year of laicism in our country." It was attended by members of the University teaching staff.

"Study was made of the connection between laicism and the moral conscience and the existence of a number of evils in our midst. Thought was also given to the relation between democracy and laicism in our society." Dr. Tunaya asked that a study should be made of the application of laicism in countries where justice and administration are laic, together with study of the situation, including that of religious freedom, in non-laic countries especially those which are the home of Islam. Another speaker said that the question as to what came within the sphere of religious duties was far from clear. It was admitted that the standards associated with laicism had not been able to influence society. The view was expressed that religion should be taught to children in school. "Let us add, however, that although we may concede that religious teachers should instruct children at school in religion, difficulties arise with the introduction of religion within the national framework of a laic State."

On the source of the Western Way of Life, a correspondent writes

in a Letter in *Forum,* on June 1st 1958, as follows: "With the reforms of Atatürk, we orientated ourselves toward the appropriation of the western way of life, that is, democracy. The most important meaning of this is that we became possessed of the high human characteristics of democracy. In democracy are attained the ultimate aims of those who are tossed about on the waves of varying political, social and economic beliefs. Where, we may ask, lies the ultimate source of the western way of life which we strive to appropriate to ourselves? We find its essence to lie in its harmonious society of individuals. Individuals in the West have created such a 'whole' society that each individual is free to exercise his own instinctive creative powers. This is what strikes one when one looks at the West. In the countries, however, where the social order is backward, this essential characteristic is not to be found. We do not see the capacity to form or to carry on united effort arising out of new ideas. Ismail Hakki Baltacioğlu, in his book *Içtimai Mektep,* has written: "The life of Personality is a scientific discovery, a moral action, a harmonious life like a symphony, a theatre play." This harmonious life can be attained only through culture. We need the assistance of all that is implied in this term Personality, in our industrial life, in religion, in administration... I want to say that this important subject should be given more space in your columns. Prof. Remzi Oguz Arik has written in his book *Ideal ve Ideoloji*: 'The aim of nationalism is not a society like a flock of sheep, but a nation born of individuals each of whom has raised himself to the status of a Person.' "

It is perhaps possible to draw the following tentative deductions from these quotations, and other sources.

1. In connection with Islam as a religion, the term 'revival' is not justifiable in the sense of the evolution of new thought, but rather in the sense of an upsurge of Orthodoxy and a return to public expression on its behalf.

2. The traditional appeal of *Mysticism* (Sufism) to Turks, as represented by the Dervish Orders, is still very strong amongst large sections of the people, perhaps as strong as it ever was. We must not underestimate the appeal of Sufism. We might learn some valuable lessons by trying to analyse what it is in the personality of the dervish (who, as Bektaşi, Mevlevi, Şazali, recurs again and again in stories) which has such an attraction. The *Dede* is, of course, the personification of that terse humour, and quick repartee, so characteristic of Turkey and expressed so neatly and so delightfully in the rich colloquial idiom of Turkish. He is an opportunist, and gives intense amusement by the often doubtful ways in which he extricates himself from awkward situations. He is, however, much more than that. Is there here a spiritual dimension which is peculiarly Turkish? The dervish is characterised by certain spiritual qualities which are supposed to render him specially beloved of God and which make him obviously beloved to the people. The famous saint and mystic poet, Yunus Emre, is mentioned today

over and over again as an ideal, in articles which are not specifically religious. The recurrent criticism of Sufism is a witness to its strength as much as to its shortcomings.

3. The values of laicism are being questioned on the very practical basis of what it has done and is doing for the character, for the "way of life", of the Turkish people. Here we are on interesting ground, since the relationship between secularism and religion, the suspicion or even consciousness of the failures of secularism together with questionings as to the scope or place of organised religion in the so-called secular spheres, the demand for some kind of balance, of harmony, of integration in personality and society, the feeling that religion is not being expressed in terms or exemplified in action in such ways as to meet the needs of contemporary life—these are but facets of one great problem we all have to meet today, Muslim, Christian and Jew alike. How will such dissatisfaction develop in Turkey? Will new creative thought be forced on Islam? Or will Orthodoxy become ever more conservative and bigoted? Can Sufism rise above its love of wonder-working and the supernatural and become expressive of a warm personal religion? Can it be focussed towards a God with Personality or is it incurably pantheistic? To what terms will laicism and religion ultimately come? The situation is not static and the laicism of Turkey today is no longer the laicism of Atatürk. Lastly we may well ask how the West can witness to, and clarify, the Christian origin of all that is best in it over and above its technical skill and its apparent "successes." Time will answer these questions in one direction or another. Meanwhile the more we know about the contemporary scene the better we shall understand.

London. W. I. England. K. H. Henrey.

BOOK REVIEWS

Lebanon in History. By Philip K. Hitti, MacMillan & Co., St. Martin's Press, New York, 1957, pp. 548.

Colonel Charles H. Churchill, writing in 1853, made a remarkable prediction about the historical role of Lebanon. He indicated that it would become a new independent state, "which, without the incentives to territorial aggrandizement, or the means of military aggression, shall yet be able to promote the great object for which ... by its geographical position it will be so eminently qualified; that of creating, developing, and upholding a commercial intercourse in the East, which shall draw together and unite the hitherto divergent races of mankind in the humanizing relations of fraternity and peace." (p. 451).

Very similar is the whole theme of Professor Hitti's newest historical study, a review of Near Eastern history as it has affected this tiny area of Lebanon. One might well ask why a volume should be devoted to the history of such a limited area. The answer is clear. The author believes that a special significance has attached in the past to this bit of land and its people, and that it has a particular contribution today and tomorrow to the intellectual, economic, and spiritual development of the whole region where Europe and Africa and Asia come together.

The value of the book lies not only in its being a vast compendium of facts relating to the region, but also in the point of view it represents: for here we have one who feels himself to be a descendant or at least an heir of the Phoenicians, writing from the point of view of the Phoenicians about their early days of glory and their accomplishments in trade and colonization and the development of alphabetic writing at a time when the Hellenes were still in barbaric darkness, waiting to learn from Sidon and Tyre those elements of civilization that would lead on to "the glory that was Greece." Everyone knows that the Phoenicians gave to Europe the alphabet and the manufacture of glass, but to see these contributions and others through the eye of a modern Phoenician and against the background of the development of that littoral life in the second millenium B.C. is another matter. It is the sort of thing we need to counterbalance histories written in the west by westerners.

The book is divided into five parts. In view of the title, Lebanon "in history," one can hardly quarrel with the rather superficial treatment in Part I of the prehistoric period, in respect to which the Lebanese coast is so rich. Part II is in many ways the most interesting of all. It deals with "the Canaanites, the first major community in Lebanon" and the "period of independence" when Byblos and Tyre and Sidon were at the peak of their greatness. Among the interesting spotlights on history here is an informal presentation of some of the Tel-el-Amarna letters from the governors of Phoenician towns to Amenhotep III and Amenhotep IV, pharoahs of Egypt. Here too is Pliny's description of how the Tyrian purple was produced, with details of the varieties and qualities of the color and the cloth. A genuine Phoenician enthusiasm enters into the telling of how Carthage grew and flourished as the greatest daughter of the great Phoenician cities.

Part III deals with the Graeco-Roman period, the peaceful development under the *pax romana*, and such significant contributions as were made by the great Roman law school in Berytus. Part IV, the Arab period, includes the Crusades and their aftermath. Professor Hitti's special interest and ability are everywhere evident here. Part V covers the Turkish and the modern periods.

The book at times suffers from the very quantity of the material included. Some pages are a compilation of a great number of technical facts from various sources not satisfactorily translated to go with their new context, (e.g., the cranial studies, p. 61); elsewhere the text seems to leap from one spot-lighted detail to another in an unrelated rapid sequence that is difficult to follow (e.g., chapter VI). Geography is sometimes confusing, particularly in chapters XXV to XXXIX, where constant reference to small villages of Lebanon, often quite fascinating to one very familiar with the country, is incomprehensible and frustrating to the lay reader. Confusing also is the impression of piecemeal writing caused by occasional repetition, or by references that seem to take no note of a similar previous reference (e.g., the origin of the Janbalats, pp. 373, 375, 377; or Mulhim's recovering of the Biqāᶜ, p. 391, lines 9 and 16). The occasional errors or implied errors are the natural result of working with secondary sources in periods which are not the author's field. The great main island of Baḥrayn is referred to as "one of the largest of the Bahrayn Islands" (p. 70). The *koine* of the New Testament is called, even in these enlightened days, "barbarous Greek" (p. 204). The Arab bridge at Dog River is called Roman (p. 412.) Oversimplification of the "evolution controversy" at the Syrian Protestant College in 1882 results in an incorrect impression (p. 464). Elsewhere the author's bias against missionary evangelism is evident (e.g., pp. 454, bottom, and 455.) — But in the end such matters are outweighed by the occasional delightful references to the tiny village of Shimlan ("Syr. 'perfect' ", p. 314), where both the author and this humble reviewer spent much of their boyhood.

The volume will be welcomed as a mine of interesting material on a part of the world increasingly important, and as a fresh point of view on the relationship of cultural influences between Europe and the Near East from the earliest times. The very full index is a valuable tool.

Beirut, Lebanon HARRY G. DORMAN JR.

The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1957. By Ivar Spector, The University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington, 1957. pp. vii, 158. $ 3.50.

This is a mimeographed publication of a major study of this important subject comprising a competent historical survey and analysis of the policies and propagandist measures of the Soviet régime vis-à-vis the various Muslim peoples. The régime has aimed at drawing these peoples into its own orbit, but so far these measures have met with little success. At the first attempt to accomplish this vast task, the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East (1920), the Russian leaders (particularly Sinoviev), committed an "unpardonable blunder" by attacking

Islam, and furthermore by singling out Mustapha Kemal Pasha for their onslaught. This alienated Muslims and antagonized Turkey. "Thus the Baku Congress served as an eye-opener to the most 'progressive' Muslims of the kind of 'liberation' the Third International had in store for them." (p. 31).

In the subsequent Soviet dealings with the Muslim peoples of Iran, Afghanistan, Arabia and Turkey, the same blunder had been repeated so that the author's final judgment is that in the Muslim countries "Islam, as well as liberation, took precedence over economic betterment. In fact, at times Islam and liberation from colonialism became so closely interwoven that it was difficult to draw a line of demarcation between them. When Soviet Russia in effect tried to substitute Red colonialism (sovietization) for Western colonialism and hurled invectives at the Islamic faith, these Muslim states turned thumbs down on the whole program" (p. 145). The author concludes that a promise of improved standards of living, whether it is offered by the West or the East, is less attractive to the Muslim peoples than one stressing "freedom, personal dignity, ... the truth of religion."

This careful study, well documented both by primary and secondary works principally in Russian, is reliably informative and very enlightening. As such it may be recommended as a useful aid to the understanding of the Soviet efforts to win the Muslim world to sovietism.

Hartford, Connecticut MATTHEW SPINKA

The Wells of Ibn Saud. By D. van der Meulen. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1957. pp. 270, illustrations, glossary, index. $ 5.50.

This is an unusually interesting and valuable book. Its author, Dr. van der Meulen, after three years of intensive study with the leading Arabic scholar of the West, Snouck Hurgronje, went to Jedda in 1926 as the Dutch Consul. He stayed on to become the Dutch Minister until 1945. During these years, a keen and kind observer, he watched the hero of this book, Ibn Saʿud make his dramatic rise to power.

One of the elements in Ibn Saʿud's quick success was the revival of Wahhābism. He used this fanatical religious zeal as a tool to unite the warring tribes. Not since the days of Muḥammad himself had Arabia been so united. The incredible hardships, the unbelievable bravery, the limitless loyalty that Ibn Saʿud called forth from his followers unfolded before the author's eyes. He wondered if in this religious resurgence lay the seeds of a spiritual renaissance. Would Ibn Saʿud be able to restore the faith of Islam as a living inspiration for its adherents? Wahhābism reached its peak in military victories. But the instrument Ibn Saʿud had created to fight his wars soon outlived its purpose. He was forced to wipe out the force that had served him best.

In this book we are introduced to other forces and personalities on the Arabian scene. One of the author's neighbors was H. St. John Philby, great as a traveller and historian, but disappointing as a man of affairs. The rivalries between Arab families pass across the stage. Arab-British relationships are given to the reader in interesting and understandable accounts. There is much history in this fine book.

But the author's main concern is with the destiny of Arabia. He watched the spiritual wells of Ibn Saʿud become inundated by wells of materialism. The discovery of oil brought a new and welcome source of wealth to the all but empty treasury. In time it swept over the old orthodox religion of the desert and covered it with thoughts of worldliness. The American companies wanted no such result, indeed they worked hard to prevent it. But it was like a great tide which nothing could stop. Nomad beduins saw luxuries they had never seen before — good food, good clothes and good houses. They wanted them. Ibn Saʿud set them an example, himself, by building large palaces and riding in expensive cars. Although he followed faithfully all the old religious requirements he had no power to make his people do so. When he finally died he was succeeded by sons accustomed to ease and luxury but not trained in discipline or diplomacy.

The book closes with two return visits of the author to Saudī Arabia. At the large oil camps on the east he saw schools and shops where Arab boys were being taught to cope with modern technology. He met with Americans who listened seriously to his warning that they who had changed the country so much were responsible for its future.

After a last visit to the present King the author watched the neon lights flood the private mosque in variegated colors. He listened to a modern loudspeaker rend the air to announce that Allah is most great. So far had it rejected the bedrock of Wahhābism on which it had been built.

Penney Farms, Florida PAUL W. HARRISON

Golgotha and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. By André Parrot, Studies in Biblical Archaeology No. 6, Translated from the French by Edwin Hudson. Philosophical Library. New York. Illustrations, 1957, pp. 127. $ 2.75

This compendious little volume follows that on the "Temple," recently reviewed in these pages. The translator has rendered the French of the Curator in Chief of the French National Museums into very readable English.

The book, which is well illustrated with the relevant pictures and furnished with copious plans, will be very useful to those with no opportunity of seeing the venerable Church themselves, and to others whether as residents or tourists. The latter, however, will have something to revive memories. It is a fascinating experience to come to the problem of the identification of holy sites from the archaeological point of view or sense the centuries of devotion in spite of all that militates against it — a phenomenon which the author frankly recognizes.

The problem is first stated succinctly from the lay-out of the "walls" — first, second, third. There follows a discussion of the relevant gates and the buildings, with other details that recall the Gospels. The traditional site is next considered. We rather wonder, however, what good is really served by retelling the history of the controversy that has raged around the Garden Tomb and Gordon's Calvary. A few matters here will be questioned; and we regret no mention of perhaps the "Anglican'" with the longest Jerusalem residence of recent decades, James

Hanauer. (In this connection of the "Garden Tomb" Note 1 on page 64 gives a somewhat wrong impression that 5 piastres are worth about 10s, when the equivalent in Mandatory times was 1s. Other "Holy Places" have had to seek their maintenance in similar ways).

The third chapter on the Church itself — and the reader will not be in doubt that the traditional site does have the imprimatur of interested scholarship for the 4th century discovery — will be generally useful; not least the notes, which all through the book are worth perusal and contain real information of people and things. The author notes his debt to famous names in the history of modern Jerusalem, which reappear in the Bibliography. More than once, however, we have wondered whether the early Christians were so concerned for the preservation of Jesus' Tomb. History rather than geography seems to have been their concern; hence the name "The Church of the Resurrection" for the Jerusalemite, not that in the title of the West. The final chapter gathers a very welcome series of notes on recently discovered burying-places and ossuaries. Here we are brought up to date while details of interest peep out on very page. For those who have been privileged to be dwellers in Jerusalem there are nostalgic memories of varied experiences. The Gospel references, historical or devotional, are always to the point.

Redhill, Surrey, England ERIC F. F. BISHOP

Multitudes in the Valley. By Denis Baly, The Seabury Press, Greenwich, Connecticut, 1957, pp. viii, 307. $ 5.00.

The title of this work, drawn from Joel iii: 14, suggests appropriately its theme, for it concerns the diversified masses of the Middle East who indeed are in the valley of crisis. The author appraises the situation out of a background of nearly two decades in the Middle East as teacher in Jordan and Israel, an experience affording ample opportunity for observation of and intimate contacts with the people of whom he writes. He is now teaching political science in Kenyon College, Ohio.

In his treatment of Israel he begins with that which is fundamental, though rarely developed by the press, the religious background of Jewish thinking. He proceeds to the historical claims of the Zionists for settlement in Palestine, emphasizing that despite disagreement of their opponents the important thing is the fact of these claims. How closely the religious is intertwined with the political. How involved, too, is the average man of the masses who, in his primary concern for shelter and sustenance, remains uninformed of the larger issues affecting his life.

Several chapters are devoted to the Arab cause. The author first describes briefly the background of Muslim religious belief, without which there can be no adequate understanding of events. As he has done for Israel, he exposes with the utmost objectivity the Arab arguments for opposing Zionism. And with a comparable frankness he explains the suspicions and fears that fill the hearts of the men of both sides, fears that condition their motives and actions.

Penning his thoughts before the creation of the United Arab Republic, but after the Suez crisis of November 1956, the writer explains Egypt's role of leadership in a frustrated Arab world and how she came to enjoy that position of leadership. If Christians are tempted to judge the actors in the present crisis by Western moral standards, the reader is reminded that all are sinners and motivated by selfish interests.

The Christian West and the Church are not so easily examined with impartiality by a writer of the Christian background. Yet the author's prolonged sojourn in the Middle East has helped in his poignant self-interpretation of the West with her fears, aspirations and desires to dominate, linking selfishness with generosity, and this on a national and international scale. Christians of the West will appreciate particularly the summary description of divided Christendom in the Middle East interspersed with the author's personal reflexions and feelings. All of the foregoing is related to the tensions presently ruling men's passions, including the role of Russia. The discussion of the theological aspects of the crisis, of the judgement of God, of the various ideologies seeking to captivate men's minds, and of the challenge to the Christian Church should give cause for thought to missionaries, laymen and Church leaders of the West.

Hartford, Connecticut ELMER H. DOUGLAS

Sultan in Oman. By James Morris, Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1957, pp. 146, illustrations, $ 3.50.

This book will have real interest for those who are concerned with Arabia. It gives some vivid pictures of Oman and its Sultan. It is also a useful portrayal of the present and the past of Southeastern Arabia. It has no message concerning the future. Indeed it is easy to see that the writer was at some pains to avoid such entanglements.

Here we have a disappearing colonialism at its best. A very carefully planned and sharply limited amount of help is given to the Sultan by Great Britain to bring about an increase in his oil revenues in the hope that the community will be benefited. That is probably what will occur if they find oil in liberal quantities. The author accompanied the Sultan as he made a triumphal march and took possession of the interior of Oman. Fifty years ago this was all part of the realm of Muscat. The very minor amount of fighting that was required had been completed by a different expeditionary force, and no effective resistance was met.

As a result we have a vivid and largely unencumbered account of the primitive districts of Dhufar and southern Arabia. The writer is an extremely competent journalist and a sharp observer. In this little book he brings before us one of the completely untamed and underprivileged areas of the earth. For the missionary statesman this makes it a valuable book. And for those who want to know, the writer gives us a first class glimpse of the circumstances under which the oil pioneers work.

Penney Farms, Florida, PAUL W. HARRISON

An Analysis of the Munir Report. Translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad, Karachi, 1957, Jamaat-i-Islami Publications, pp. 241. Rs. 5.

The challenge posed by the Munir Report (*Report of the Court of Inquiry under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953,* Superintendent of Government Printing, Lahore, W. Pakistan, 1954.) to the individuals and groups associated with the ʿulamāʾ in the Aḥmadiyyah controversy has been accepted by the Jama'at-i-Islami with the publication of *An Analysis of the Munir Report.* According to a statement on the dust jacket, "it exposes the Report as boldly as the Report misrepresents Islam." In a lengthy introduction the editor points to the wide influence enjoyed by the Munir Report among Western students and the need for a corrective in this unfortunate circumstance. He has also taken up the question of intolerance and Islam and the misunderstandings which have gained currency concerning this question. The Analysis, itself, deals in turn with the findings of the Court of Inquiry, the treatment of the Islamic State, which the writers of the Analysis feel was outside of the proper terms of reference of the Inquiry, and the effect of the Report on the Qadiani problem itself. The Analysis is critical of the type of inquiry made, the manner in which it was carried out, and the misrepresentation of facts which it says the Report contains. Most of all it resents the spirit of antagonism to Islam and Islamic ideals which, it says, characterizes the Report. This book has importance in the context of the continuing debate on ideological problems in Pakistan.

Hartford, Connecticut STANLEY E. BRUSH

Tensions in the Middle East. Edited by Philip W. Thayer, Introduction by Charles Malik, Baltimore, Maryland, Johns Hopkins Press, 1958, Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press. End papers map. pp. 350. $ 5.50

This is a splendid book in the series of publications of The Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. For the 300 persons privileged to hear the essays when delivered at the School's 1957 Conference it is an appreciated record. For the teachers, advanced students, political personnel and international businessmen not present, it provides data and dates about peoples and personalities and their movements and motives, and many other items necessary to be known, for the guidance of sound judgments and decisions.

Of the thirteen major papers, four presented the historical and contemporary background of the whole area. Four more described the economic, social and religious conditions there, and five others discussed specific problems embodying the region's important tensions. After the first essay on each subject, a commentator of equal authority added his views on it, in agreement or disagreement or in supplement with additional facts and opinions. Thus twenty-six essays, plus introductory and concluding papers, all ably edited, provide rich material for specialists and others concerned with world affairs.

Full understanding of the subjects discussed was the objective of the conference and the book. A single author or teacher dealing with the Middle East would find it difficult to combine expert competence in

the strategic military, political, economic, social, religious, historical and current activities and desires of the numerous different peoples of those lands. The excellence of this book is that here specialists in a dozen humanistic sciences apply their knowledge, often drawn from experience, to an area not homogeneous but interrelated, whose associations with the rest of the world are of vital importance.

Not all the germane subjects nor all of the material within each subject could be included and considered within the time limits of the conference. For instance, consider the economic importance of tourism and its relationship to tensions. Tourism has been and can again be a source of enormous income for the Middle East. The cultural attraction of the antiquities of Egypt, Iraq and India will continue when the wealth of Arabia Petrolia is exhausted. Surely the promotion of tourism is a valid reason for friendship between nations that desire national self-determination, personal dignity and welfare and good will toward others in the world. Leaders of thought and action in the Middle East who study these essays will find plenty of reasons to deter them from choosing Iron Curtain practices, satellite status and racial, religious or party discrimination policies for their people.

Readers of Western countries will notice that it was mainly the essayists with Eastern affiliations who emphasized the pervasive, if not paramount, importance of their religions in the lives of Oriental peoples and the consequent necessity to know those religions in order to understand Oriental psychologies and actions.

Hartford, Connecticut EDWIN E. CALVERLEY

Islam Inflamed. By James Morris, Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1957, pp. 326, $ 5.00.

Here is a remarkable book which deserves careful reading. Much of it can be read with genuine pleasure more than once, for there are passages of real poetry, incisive utterance, brilliant description, worthwhile experience. The book is comprehensively conceived, centered in an experience of time and place which is never forgotten. Though we should take exception to nearly all the countries mentioned as allegedly constituting, or having constituted, part of the "Middle East," this disagreement must not assert itself too sharply. For there is no doubt that in these pages is material which should be pondered alike by all those called to positions of responsibility in the total area described, be they in diplomatic, commercial or missionary service. We are not sure whether the attractive and vital title represents the total picture of "Ecumenical Islam" with Pakistan hardly on the canvas and with most of Africa and all Indonesia not there at all. This means partly that there might well be Parts 2 and 3 from the same gifted pen.

James Morris is not a stranger to the countries which are spread out, mostly politically, before the reader. There are digressions into past history, recent and remote, which illuminate situations. Few mistakes were noted. There can only be a restricted number of reviewers sufficiently *au fait* with the total area surveyed to presume on criticism save in detail. This can only be advanced by those familiar with a specific

district. Thus twice (pp. 152, 160) Beit Jala is mentioned as the village suffering from "barbed wire demarcation"; it should be Beit Safafa. We think, too, that the author is confusing two Arabic roots for milk when he comes to Aleppo; and consultation with the work of Jeffery might have been wise before committing oneself over the "Sabians."

But the main disappointment is that so often, after a scintillating and understanding description of places and often of the related problems, the concluding sentences are not of the same pattern. We are left guessing as to how much Arabic the author knows, or whether there may have been too great dependence on "interpreters." We wish wholeheartedly that his familiarity with "States" and sometimes their leadership, his knowledge of buildings, his gift for bringing scenery to life, were paralleled by that knowledge of ordinary people which is growing so insistently needful in these days. These things however are blemishes, for one and all are remediable. They must not be allowed to obscure the merits as the author transports his readers on his "magic carpet" around the great cities from Cairo to Teheran or the interesting places from Aleppo to Aden. Particular attention should be given to his pages dealing with the smaller Arab States.

Books of this nature are all too soon outdated (e.g. here the sad changes, in the royal houses of Jordan and Persia.) Does not the author continually say *1956*? While it is a pity that the dust-cover is badly astray over the name of the President of Egypt, making nonsense of it, the previous sentences would find an echo in the judgement of the average reader. There is no question that here is much more than journalese; there is interpretation of the world of this area today that is not only authoritative but of a nature to become classic.

Redhill, Surrey, England ERIC F. F. BISHOP

Materials on Muslim Education in the Middle Ages. By A. S. Tritton, London, Luzac and Co., 1957. pp. 209. Price 35/—.

This is a remarkable production being a scholar's life-long collection of statements about education, teachers, students and other persons concerned with schools and culture. Over 300 names of Muslims and others are mentioned and over 130 books.

One can only marvel at the keenness of the compiler in noting every sentence in Arabic and other languages dealing with education and then recording author, book and page. Magazine articles are also used, including three from this quarterly. The author's collection of index cards must be priceless, for it surely includes many other subjects besides education and theology. His colleagues, students and university have served scholarship well in encouraging the publication of this volume.

The book's title is most modest. It calls its contents merely "Materials," as if the author hoped an architect would come along to make a blueprint of an integrated educational edifice, and then a historian or social scientist to describe the lives, aims and accomplishments of the people whose words are recorded.

The contents of the book are splendidly classified. The materials are logically presented: elementary and advanced education; teachers

and students; method and school life; institutions and curriculum; educated women, including mention of the Story of Tawaddud, which Lane thought too dull for his translation of *The Arabian Nights,* but which scholars nevertheless value for its information about Muslim mediaeval education.

The facts and ideas presented in this book are so numerous that quick reading is inadvisable if details and impressions are to be retained. The over-all conviction will probably be that Education in Islam aimed to promote the Muslim attitude toward life. It inspired, directed and limited the concerns and activities of life to the welfare of the soul. The welfare of the body did not go beyond its immediate needs. Secular education was strictly utilitarian. It was part of the excellence of his religion that he avoided what did not promote his future well-being. The good Muslim would learn enough of astronomy to know the times of the worship and enough geography to get to Mecca on the pilgrimage. The social sciences belong to modern goverment educational institutions.

Hartford, Connecticut EDWIN E. CALVERLEY

The Middle East, 1958. Sixth Edition, Europa Publications, Ltd., London, 1958, pp. 477. $ 13.50 net.

This survey of the geographical, historical, economic, and educational situation of the twelve countries of the Middle East includes also accounts of the formation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, with its provisional constitution, and the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan and the Agreement Proclamation. The very inclusion of these developments of February 1958 in a publication whose publication date is in the same month is an indication of the editors' desire to keep the survey up-to-date.

Previous editions of the Survey appeared in 1948, 1950, 1953, 1955 and 1957. That another is published in 1958 indicates appreciation of the quality of the presentation. Egypt, Arabia and Israel have the largest number of pages and only the Lebanon has less than twenty. To this reviewer it appears that the description of Muscat and Oman could be extended and improved by an account of Inner Oman.

The descriptions of the religions of the region are without error but all too brief to estimate their importance in the lives of the peoples. Islam is correctly described as a civilization, and only in a few countries is the temporal ruler also the religious leader, but the peoples retain their religious loyalties. Religion overrides nationalism.

A statement on p. 30 could be reconsidered: "Some members of pre-Islamic society (in Arabia) carried their aversion to women so far as to destroy their female children at birth." Another explanation is that fathers unable to provide for their girls or protect them from strong enemy tribes, preferred to put them to death rather than fall into enemy hands. Girls were the favorite booty of raiders. There is a serious statement on p. 11 that every one concerned about the Middle East should ponder carefully, yes, prayerfully: "The main element in the present-day politics of the Middle East is the existence of the state of Israel ... and there can be no real friendship or understanding with

the West until support for Zionism is disavowed." Let this be considered also. The plight of the Palestinian Refugees in Egypt, Jordan and the Lebanon is still terrible. Increased hatred of the Israeli refusal of just reparations and the fear of Zionist plans of expansion continue to burn in the breasts of the Arabs and keep the Middle East the danger area of the world.

Hartford, Connecticut EDWIN E. CALVERLEY

Dr. Sa'eed of Iran: Kurdish Physician to Princes and Peasants, Nobles and Nomads. By Jay M. Rasooli and Cady H. Allen, Grand Rapids International Publications, 1957, pp. 188. $ 2.95.

As the Christian Church extends across the world there are certain individuals whose colorful lives should be preserved for the annals and inspiration of the whole Church. One such beyond doubt is Dr. Sa'eed of Iran, especially since he was a convert from Islam in one of the Bible lands, Iran or Persia.

His life is already known, in *The Beloved Physician of Teheran,* written by a friend, Dr. Isaac Yonan, and published by the Cokesbury Press of Nashville, Tenn. in 1934. The writer of this review also published a short account of Dr. Sa'eed's remarkable life in *The Christian Message to Islam,* pp. 120-133, this story being largely from his own lips. Now we have a more extended biography by one who knew him very well, a nephew and son of the brother who had desired to kill Dr. Sa'eed when he first became a Christian. Jay M. Rasooli checked his facts very carefully and finally reduced the size of the biography to about half its original length. Then Cady H. Allen, who had known Dr. Sa'eed intimately for many years, assisted in preparing the book for publication. Thus we have a most carefully verified account of this life which was certainly more powerful as truth than any fictional account could be.

It is the fascinating story of a young boy from the Kurdish mountains of Western Iran, who became a Muslim priest and religious leader when he was very young. Then the story of how he was led to Christ, and the severe persecution his confession occasioned. His own brother waited with his rifle to kill the apostate. The surprising sequel is that the brother too finally became a Christian evangelist.

From his study of medicine at the American Hospital in Hamadan, Dr. Sa'eed went to London and came back to Iran to become the beloved physician to people of high and low degree. He was also to the end a marvelous witness to his Christian faith. He was the first convert from Islam to preach in the Teheran Church and his name certainly should go down as one of the pioneer apostles of the Christian Church in Iran.

Princeton, N.J. J. CHRISTY WILSON

SHORTER NOTICES

Mohammed V. King of Morocco. By Rom Landau, "Morocco" Publishers, Rabat, (U.S. address: 12-14 Wyoming Avenue, N.W., Washington 8, D. C.), pp. 155, paper, Illustrations, 1957.

This is a record in word and picture of the first thirty years of the reign of the King of Morocco by a competent writer and eminent authority on this land. The author, who published a biography of King Mohammed V in 1951, relates the important events of the King's life and country from that date to the present. He begins with the death of the present King's father in 1927 and, without introducing details of a full biography, opens windows on the personal life of King Mohammad V during the period of the French Protectorate, on the occasion of his meeting with President Roosevelt, his exile by the French in 1953, his return to the throne two years later, and on his efforts to solve the economic and social problems of his country during the past few years. Of particular value are the personal glimpses, by pen and photo, of a monarch who is giving himself to the transformation of his country from a state of mediaevalism to one commensurate with the demands of the present century.

Secondary Education in the Arab States. American University of Beirut, Lebanon, 1957. pp 225, in Arabic.

The contents of this book represent the substance of the work of the third Educational Conference which was held in Beirut, August 14-18, 1956. Educational agencies in Arab countries have already cooperated with UNESCO and the Arab League to spread elementary education in harmony with the contemporary social renaissance and national goals. According to the social and psychological developments in the Arab countries, the second step was to study secondary education from the following view-points: (a) its philosophy, (b) its aims, (c) its curricula, (d) its relation to society, and (e) its relation to higher education.

The conference was organized by the "Educational Circle" of the American University of Beirut, headed by Dr. Habib Korany. It invited the Arab countries to send delegates to discuss these points and all were represented. The book is a valuable work of reference and gives a clear picture of the educational standards and attitudes in the Arab countries and of the problems faced by educators. Its suggestions are of great importance for the promotion of education.

Decisive Years in Palestine, 1918-1948. By Erich W. Bethmann, American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., 47 East 67th Street, New York 21, N. Y., pp. 60, paper, 1957.

This booklet, No. 13 in the Minaret Series, traces developments in Palestine from World War I through the Mandate period, the establishment of Israel and the division of Palestine. A chronological table and two maps enable the reader to grasp the salient points in the historical background of the present turbulence in this area.

An Outline of Moroccan Culture. By Rom Landau, "Morocco" Publishers, Rabat, pp. 56, illustrations.

Moroccan culture is closely linked with that of Spain, asserts the author who has been a student of Morocco for over three decades and has written and lectured extensively on the subject. He discusses Moroccan architecture, the minor arts, agriculture. He treats briefly Moroccan-Jewish relations in historical perspective. At greater length he dwells on Morocco's intellectual life, its geographers, and educational development. He concludes with an attempt to prognosticate the future. The work is profusely and agreeably illustrated.

Memoirs of a Centenarian. By Arthur Judson Brown. Edited by William N. Wysham. New York, World Horizons, Inc., 1957, pp. 174. $ 2.50.

They are fortunate who have the opportunity to read this book, for the author has had a memorable life. His personal qualities inspire emulation. His response to invitations to greater service encourage strenuous faithfulness in present duties. His wise and unselfish leadership in noble causes won the participation of men of great resources and eminent positions. He became the leader of leaders because he appreciated their abilities and gave them full scope. The chapters recording the altruistic activities he directed are amazing. Even more so are those that deal with the great religious problems: God and the world, evil and the good, this life, immortality and perdition, faith and Christ. Interviews with a person of such wide and long experience and superior mental power, discussing matters of eternal import, would be treasured occasions. The book, like the life of the author, expresses his convictions with genuine modesty, great clarity and convincing force. It is a Christian document of unique excellence, which could well be read by thoughtful non-Christians.

Introducing Islam, by J. Christy Wilson, Friendship Press, New York, 1958. pp. 64, paper, 60 cents.

A revision of the booklet published under the same title in 1950, this work takes into consideration changes and developments in the world of Islam since that date. Inexactitudes of the early edition have been rectified. An adequate review may be found in the January 1951 issue of this Quarterly. The intervening years have proved its usefulness as a means of initiation into a knowledge of the basic facts of the origin, spread, practices and tenets of Islam.

Middle Eastern Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Mainland China. By Robert Loring Allen, Woodrow Wilson Department of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1958. pp. 128. $ 1.00, paper.

In this series of research papers presented, under the direction of Dr. R. C. Allen, by the University of Virginia, the writers attempt not "a definite appraisal of Soviet bloc purposes, achievements, and potential, but rather to share essential data in the hope that it will stimulate the interest of economists and other social scientists concerned with the problem, and perhaps contribute to studies and analyses quite independent of the research program going forward at Charlottesville."

An abundance of data is provided in the fields of trade actually car-

ried on, bilateral commercial arrangements, efforts to promote trade, intermediate and long-term credit for arms and economic development, amount and terms of arms transactions. A statement is made of Soviet motivation in the Middle East and of Middle East reactions to Soviet advances. The conclusion predicts that the way the Middle East will eventually turn "depends in no small part upon the caution and intelligence the Middle East exercises in the conduct of its international economic affairs during the next few years."

The appendices provide copious statistics and a selected bibliography.

An Interpretation of Islam. By Laura Veccia Vaglieri, Translated from Italian by Aldo Caselli, The American Fazl Mosque, Washington, D. C., 1957. pp. 87. $ 1.00.

This intriguing little book from the pen of the Professor of Arabic and History of Muslim Civilization at the University of Naples, Italy, follows the Aḥmadiyyah line. The author, who originally published it under the title *Apologia dell' Islamismo* (1925), intimates that neglect of the Qurʾān has been a primary cause of Islamic decline. "It is to the holy book which has never been altered ... that Muslims will return. As they drink directly from this holy book, they will not fail to be reinvigorated. There is strong evidence that this process has already begun (p. 87)."

Seven chapters, in scholarly yet popular vein, distill much thought and research. Islam's spread, dogma, rites, morals, rule and civilization, mysticism, and relation to science are sympathetically reviewed. As apologetic, the work is very slanted and goes far in adulation. Nor does it clarify what standards Muslims will observe in their recovery of Quranic vitality.

Buddhist Himalaya. By David Snellgrove, Philosophical Library, New York and Glasgow, 1957. Illustrations, maps, pp. xii, 324. $ 10.00.

Dr. Snellgrove is Lecturer in Tibetan at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He has produced within the compass of this small volume the most comprehensive and lucid exposition of the origins and nature of the religion of the Tibetan and Tibetan-related peoples that this reviewer has seen. It is worthy to take an honored place among the relatively few works in this field. To those interested in the history of religions, or in Tibet, Nepal, and Sikkim, this book is recommended without reservation. Appended are notes, *mandalas,* a chronological table, a bibliography, notice of Tibetan works and indices.

Let's Visit South East Asia. By John C. Caldwell, John Day Co., New York, 1957, pp. 96, illustrations, $ 2.95.

This book records what the author saw during a recent visit to South East Asia, set against the background of history and current politics. There are a few inexactitudes e.g. James Brooke of Sarawak was succeeded, not by his son, but by his nephew: many Malayan Chinese speak two or more dialects as well as English or other foreign language, whereas it is said on p. 44 that they speak only one. etc. But despite these several points of 'touristic' imprecision, the book will repay any interested reader.

NOTES OF THE QUARTER

Neutralism and Arabism. It never has been the purpose or policy of the *Muslim World* to attempt commentary on the political tumults of the contemporary world. Its aim is more deeply located and has to do with the issues that do not by their nature make headlines. Moreover quarterlies these days are hardly designed to cope commentarily with a situation that is momentarily in flux! However the alarums and excursions occasioned by the upheaval in Baghdad in July last suggest a few reflections, not so much on events themselves as on a pattern of western reaction.

Despite assurances in the economic and political fields intended to quieten western apprehensions, at least for a while—apprehensions all too sharply aroused by the unrepentant violence of the liquidation of the Royal house and the Nuri-al-Said régime—(which contrasted with the dignified and bloodless methods of the original Revolution under Muḥammed Naguib in Cairo)—it is plain that Iraq has seen the end of the era that began with Faisal the 1st and of the political patterns established during and after the brief Iraqi Mandate when friendships with the west rested on personal and dynastic foundations. The termination of the monarchy is the form of a violent quarrel with the shape of Arab nationalism since 1921. It is hardly likely to be less assertive in its republican form.

Yet precisely when Iraq falls into line with new patterns of Arab self-expression which involve a repudiation of nearly four decades of their own history because of their too close association with western sources and links, western policy seems to aim at a neutralising halt to all such changes elsewhere. It does so genuinely in the name of the independence of small countries and in apprehension of what the lack of such a moratorium on old political debts may mean for the future of Israel and the economic prosperity of the whole region. But what the west regards as the independence of small nations is seen from the other side as the maintenance of the status quo and the permanent abeyance of aspirations the patterns of whose actualisation elsewhere have proved so successful, and therefore so intoxicating. All that hardly adds up to a prospect of tranquillity.

It is true that there are many common interests in the commercial and economic realms which (like the Suez issue after frustrating and barren pursuit of emotional wilfulness) could prove susceptible of bartered solution. But whereas, in the Suez crisis, the heady emotion had, in the end, to be foresworn by European powers, in the larger and more inclusive crisis of which the Baghdad coup is merely another stage, the sobriety and restraint have to be learned by a movement of Arab self-assertion that is in the full tide of action and ambition. The achievement of realism and of peace will be correspondingly all the harder.

Meanwhile—and this is one of the deeper issues of the whole Lebanese crisis—growing Arab nationalism makes ever more exacting the task of the Christian minorities in being creative and restrained in their part within an Arab world that no longer allows them any

external securities (by means of protége-ship elsewhere) and at the same time makes them more and more dependent on the concepts of tolerance by which the dominant Islam is motivated. These last, it would appear, are still in process of definition.

The Accra Conference. From April 15 to the 22nd, 1958, Accra, Ghana, provided the setting for a conference of eight independent African states. Of these states four are predominantly Arab and Muslim: United Arab Republic, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco. One, the Sudan, is one-half Muslim, the other half being Christian or pagan. Three, Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, have important Muslim populations. One-third of Ethiopia's fifteen million inhabitants are Muslims. It has been estimated that Liberia has less than one-half million Muslims. Ghana may have 200 to 250 thousand Muslims out of a population of less than five million.

Besides the official representatives of the above-mentioned states, there were also present at this conference an exiled nationalist leader from the Cameroons, a Somali representative from the Italian-administered U.N. Trust territory, and three representatives of the Algerian rebels. The conference was organized and presided over by Ghana's Prime Minister, Mr. Kwame Nkrumah, whose opening address declared what appeared to be the object and prevailing theme of the conference, namely, liberation of the colonial areas of Africa. The U.A.R. representative recognized the dual responsibility of his country as an Asian and African state.

Clearly the preoccupations of the delegates were of a political nature, notably, the colonial situation in Africa, the Algerian problem, and racial discrimination. Commentators concur in attributing to the conferees a large measure of agreement on these issues. However, a cultural committee was elected, a fact which indicated a concern for other than purely political interests. An appeal was made to the various great powers to cease the production and testing of nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the preoccupations of the delegates as so defined, two significant trends deserve mention. The first is the rapprochement of Muslim lands to African states whose populations are not predominantly Muslim, a phenomenon which may have more than political significance in the future. For contacts of this type, occasioned by circumstances of mutual concern, may bring on intellectual, cultural and spiritual reactions. The increasing influence of Islam in Africa, south of the Sahara, must create more than casual interest in the minds of the Christian populations, and may eventually be one of the determining factors in the fate of paganism where it still exists.

The second trend is the process of drawing together or of unification, something more than mere cooperation, of the North African states, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. The Maghrib is after all geographically set apart from the rest of the Muslim world. The tendency toward a more homogeneous Maghrib, spiritually one with the world of Islam though politically separate, may be expected to be accentuated rather than diminished in the future. What this may mean for cultural and religious developments in the land which holds a justifiable pride

in its distinguished ancestor, Ibn Khaldūn, no one can at this moment foresee. But what is becoming more and more evident is the desire of the Maghrib to play its appropriate rôle on the stage of world Islam and in the universal family of nations.

Who is an Israeli? An interesting issue, which has long been latent in the very concept of Israel, has lately come much to the fore. It has parallels with the ever present question within Islam as to who precisely is the Muslim. It arose over the question of identity cards, and has produced strong tensions within, and outside, the coalition of parties that constitutes the present Government in Tel Aviv. The secularist Minister of the Interior, Mr Bar Yahuda, decided in June last that anyone who declared in good faith that he was a Jew and practised no other religion was, in the eyes of the law, a Jew.

The Cabinet directed the decision following on the recommendations of a committee of three set up to advise it. The ruling caused considerable disappointment in the minds of those who believe that something more than declaration is necessary to establish and authenticate valid Jewishness. Nor is the question merely academic. For obviously by one set of criteria many would qualify who would not under another. There have been cases of mixed marriages where one of the parties continues to practise the Christian faith but both agree to declare their children to be Jews—a view which does not satisfy the religious elements and the Rabbinate. The issue would no doubt be more sharp, were it not for the saving fact that identity cards so denominating Jews, have no more validity than as police documents and do not prejudice any aspects of juridical status for purposes of marriage, divorce and inheritance.

The Knesset has been debating the question as to what is Zionism. Is it something beyond citizenship of the State of Israel? Does it have validity beyond the fact of that State? Should the concept give way wholly to that of the Israeli? If not, what would the distinction imply?

The whole problem ultimately goes back to the implicit difficulties of linking statehood with religion. The parallel with certain dilemmas of definition, for example in Pakistan (cf. the Report of the Judicial Enquiry into the Punjab Riots of March, 1953) is both obvious and intriguing.

Muslim Marriage in Malaya. Of late in the Singapore press there has been a spirited advocacy of the banning of polygamy. Two striking features of the controversy are the way in which Quranic directives are attributed to the Prophet's mind and the tendency to blame the prevalence of divorce on the ʿulamāʾ and qāḍīs. One writer insists that the "although our Holy Prophet has permitted a Muslim up to four wives at a time he stresses on the fact that if such a man cannot act equitably to two, three or four, he should marry only one." The verse and the exegesis are familiar enough: what is interesting is the plain implication, re-iterated elsewhere, that the law of the Qurʾān is what the Prophet permits or prohibits. It may be that this is more casual than intentional. There is no doubt that the attacks on

official personnel are conscious and deliberate. One of the reasons for unwise (and to the women unfair and degrading) plural marriages, it is argued, is that "when issuing marriage and divorce licenses our religious teachers have been permitted to keep for themselves the requisite fees charged... This has turned out to be a very lucrative source of income to them, but with very distressing results on the Muslim community." One of the first items of reform, it is claimed, should be a rule setting aside all such fees for Muslim widows and orphans.

The advocates of compulsory monogamy declare that the permission for polygamy in the Prophet's time was meant to be an exception, and had to do with passing, historical factors obtaining in those days e.g. the preponderance of women in the community because of battles for the faith and the consequent need also of orphans and widows. "This concession is now being grossly abused by Muslims who insist upon it being one of the tenets of our religion." In point of fact the Prophet never meant it for a situation like that in present-day Malaya, where there is no imbalance between the sexes and it is economically impracticable for polygamy to continue. It is clear that polygamy is really a quasi-legal form of prostitution in the sense that advantage is taken of a law for no other reason than sexual appetite and with no acceptance of real responsibility. What was temporarily permitted for a limited purpose is exploited by selfishness. Malaya, it is said, needs an Ataturk in this regard. The hollowness of the pleas for polygamy is seen in the fact that whereas the original permission relates to widows, it is not these that modern polygamists normally choose to take. As one immediate reform, questions of marriage and divorce might be taken out of the hands of religious officials and entrusted to courts with strict conditions safeguarding the permission to contract plural marriage. Such courts should not be browbeaten by parties of high status. They should permit no marriage unless both parties are in full and explicit agreement. Such divorces as are permitted should be on condition of adequate provision for the rejected wife.

Mosques in South Africa. The Group Areas Act of South Africa is falling foul of Islamic rights and practices. It lays down that one year after a particular area has been "declared white," Asians and negro Africans are forbidden to worship in houses of worship within the area so specified as colourless, unless there is a permit. These have to be asked for annually and introduce an element of uncertainty and 'by your leave' into the freedom of worship. Certain mosques in Pretoria and elsewhere, notably in Cape Town and Durban, fall within such restricted areas. Islamic law forbids the alienation of mosques so that there is no solution by desacrilising the mosques and erecting new ones elsewhere. The Government will gravely offend Muslim sentiment everywhere if it tries to expropriate the mosques. A more ultimate problem still is how the land on which a mosque stands is to pass into white ownership, as the Act requires, since under Islamic law no mosque can stand on land owned by an unbeliever in Islam.

Toumliline. In Morocco has appeared a new quarterly which will interest particularly those who are concerned with a serious consideration of Muslim-Christian relationships. It is entitled *Toumliline,* the name of the locality on the slopes of the Moroccan Atlas where a group of Benedictine monks established themselves in a monastery in 1952. At present the group numbers some thirty members. Their aim is, as it has been traditionally, service to God by prayer and work. Traditionally, too, they exercise hospitality and emphasize learning. They have a farm, machine and wood-working shops. Rooms are provided for guests. There is naturally a chapel for devotions. Social service enterprises include an orphanage for boys, a well-equipped medical dispensary with a full-time doctor and nurse administering daily to the physical ills of local inhabitants, a students' hostel, camp facilities. The center of the monastic life seems to be the library, with its treasure of some 15,000 books and periodicals, many on Islam and North Africa.

In 1955 some forty Muslim students from educational institutions in Morocco or from universities in France assembled for study and exchange of views. The satisfaction derived from this experience led to a similar gathering in the summer of 1956 of 120 students from twelve nations. On this occasion they remained for three weeks listening to lectures, exchanging ideas in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual comprehension.

These gatherings were the predecessors of the 1957 session which was organized about the theme of "Education" and which attracted 200 participants from 26 nations. One of the happy results of this session was the publication of *Toumliline,* in French, containing 160 pages of lectures, by both Christian and Muslim scholars. Some of the subjects treated were: *Man and His Perfection According to Muslim Theology, Christian Meaning of Man, Means and Aims of Education in the Religious Atmosphere of Islam and Christianity, Meeting of East and West.*

Treatment of such themes may well inaugurate a new era of dialogue on a cultural and religious plane, fruitful for minds appreciative of sincerity and frankness though conscious of disparity of conviction. It is proposed to publish *Toumliline* quarterly. The address is: Monastère de Toumliline (Azrou), Morocco.

A Christian greets Muslims during Ramaḍān. Here is the text of an Open Letter to Al-Haji Y. P. O. Shodeinde—published in Lagos, Nigeria, *Daily Times,* March 21, 1958, and reprinted here because it concerns issues and attitudes elsewhere also.

> My dear Sir,
>
> May I be permitted to offer you and your fellow Muslims my sincere good wishes for the month of Ramaḍān. I greet you "Eku ongbe," and pray that your fast may be acceptable to God and a time of blessing to you.
>
> Some may be surprised that a Christian missionary should offer you these friendly greetings. We have heard such a lot lately about "Christians attacking Muslims!" But personally, I thank God when

I see any man seeking for divine blessing. Whether he be Christian, Muslim or Buddhist, I will pray that he may find what he seeks.

I would also venture to congratulate you on the articles you usually write in the "Daily Times" about the Muslim fast. You follow the tradition of Al-Ghazālī, and of the Prophet himself, in saying that if the only result of a Muslim's fast is hunger and thirst, his fast is valueless. You wisely insist that fasting is a means of spiritual discipline, and an opportunity to devote oneself to worship and good works.

It is a pity that some Christians are guilty of spoiling Ramaḍān by strife and contention. They go about calling the Muslims hypocrites, and accusing them of fasting only for show, or of eating secretly by day.

I am ashamed of my brethren who act like this. Perhaps the accusation may be true of some who call themselves Muslims; if so, I know that Islamic leaders are anxious to correct them, and we can safely leave them to your care. We Christians have plenty of hypocrisy of our own to worry about, and we had better reform ourselves before we turn to criticise others.

On the other hand I hope that Muslims also will avoid spoiling Ramaḍān with strife. We have known a few who make it a time to provoke Christians, trying to argue that the Christians ought to be fasting in the Muslim way.

In fact, it is well known that Jesus did not lay down any particular rules of fasting for his followers. We Christians have our ways of devotion, and you have yours. Let us allow each man to discipline his soul, according to his own custom.

That is not to say that "one religion is as good as another." Neither you nor I believe that! I think the vital difference between us is this: ISLAM says that a man must be obedient to the Five Pillars of religion (of which fasting is one), in order to gain merit with God and so counterbalance his evil deeds (Surah xxiii. 104-5).

The Gospel says that God is so Holy, and sin is so terrible in His sight, that no good deeds we do can ever justify us. But in this desperate plight, the God of Love has acted in a unique way to save us.

A Saviour has been among men, to bring us back to God. He was more than a man, and higher than the angels. No one can express the mystery of His person. "And you shall call His name Jesus, for He will save His people from their sins."

(signed) Rev. J. H. S. Crossley.
Wesley College, Ibadan.

Religious services in Arabic in England. Last Christmas time radio listeners in Amman, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Haifa, Beirut, Kuwait and other centers of the Middle East reported their pleasure in listening to an Eastern Christmas service by a B.B.C. broadcast from London. With Prayerbooks from Cairo and Hymnals from Beirut it could not

fail to impress hearers with a sense of fundamental unity and solidarity among Arabic-speaking Christians, of whatever land, as they commemorated the coming of Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace. It is to be hoped that a similar broadcast may be arranged for next Christmas. Since September, 1957, religious services in Arabic have been held, on the last Sunday of each month, in the Church of St. Margaret, Lothbury, London.

The Reverend Eric F. F. Bishop has charge of these services. Several guest preachers, sons of the Arabic language, have given addresses and other well-known personalities in the Christian Arab world are expected to do so. All those who understand Arabic are reminded of this service on the last Sunday of each month if they are in London. Also it is desired that the presence of Arab ministers in London be made known.

Miscellanea. According to a decree of November 22, 1957, the legal age of marriage for girls in Morocco was set at fifteen and for boys at eighteen. Women will have the right to choose their husbands without the compulsion of their parents. Furthermore, divorce regulations favor the woman, since she will have the right to initiate suits. The woman may also exact from the husband a legal guarantee that he will not take a second wife. The law does not prohibit polygamy, but the restrictive measure makes it obligatory upon the man to secure the consent of his wife before he may take a second wife.

The "Daily Times" of Lagos, Nigeria, March 11, 1958, carried an article expressing the dissatisfaction of Muslims in being obliged to send their children to non-Muslim schools. It was claimed that, as Muslim children had been greatly influenced by Christianity, Muslim children should attend non-Muslim schools only when there were no vacancies in Muslim schools. According to this article, the Minister of Education had promised to draw up a syllabus that will give every Muslim child the chance to be taught the Arabic language in school.

In July last, for three weeks, a Summer School in Islamics was held in Jerusalem under the auspices of the Near East Christian Council. It had more than seventy resident members who attended from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Muscat, Tunis, Algeria, Egypt, the Sudan and Turkey. Several local Jerusalemites also were present in the sessions, which covered "Islam: Past and Present" and "Islamic Issues in New Testament Study." Among those who gave lectures were Professor Muhammad Daud Rahbar, of the University of Ankara, Shaikh Musa al Bukhary of Jerusalem Old City, Dr. Yusuf Shammas of Beirut, Professor F. V. Winnett of the University of Toronto and the Rev. Eric F. F. Bishop, formerly Lecturer in Arabic in the University of Glasgow.